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Musicians, Politicians, and the Forgotten
Tort
Arlen W. Langvardt*
Election seasons regularly reveal uses of songs and recordings at
campaign events and in campaign ads. Frequently, well-known performers who have recorded the songs object to the uses of the songs and recordings (and their recognizable voices). Often, the performers do not
own the copyright to the songs or the recordings, so they have no copyright
infringement claim to bring. Performers who seek legal relief against
those responsible for the political uses have relied, thus far, on right of
publicity claims or false endorsement claims under section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act. However, judicial concerns about the proper reach and
application of those theories, and uncertainties about how to account for
First Amendment interests, make the right of publicity and false endorsement less-than-reliable theories for performers to invoke against
political users.
This Article proposes the use of a different theory in this setting: the
forgotten tort of false light publicity. It is well established that this
theory—one that performers have yet to invoke and commentators have
not addressed—may be employed in response to defendants’ noncommercial speech, assuming the relevant First Amendment requirements are
met. The First Amendment aspects of false light publicity were set long
ago by the Supreme Court. For courts, the false light publicity theory has
the virtues of setting the governing rules relatively clearly and avoiding
the uncertainties presented by the theories that performers have employed
thus far against political users. Some performers’ claims should succeed
under false light publicity principles, and others should not. At least,
however, the false light publicity theory offers reasonable ways to balance
the competing expressive interests of performers and political candidates.
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INTRODUCTION
It happens multiple times during every election season. At
campaign rallies or in televised political advertisements (“ads”),
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candidates for office and groups supporting them use songs and
recordings whose copyrights belong to other individuals or organizations. Sometimes the use of the music seems designed to set a
certain tone or create enthusiasm at a campaign event; in other instances, musically reinforcing a visual or textual message to wouldbe voters serves as the apparent purpose.
Early in the 2016 presidential primary season, for example, Donald Trump’s campaign used Adele’s recording of Rolling in the
Deep1 and two older, but still familiar, recordings: Neil Young’s
Rockin’ in the Free World and Aerosmith’s Dream On.2 Adele,
Young, and Steven Tyler (of Aerosmith) were not flattered. All
three insisted that the Trump campaign cease using the musical
works.3 Later, Mick Jagger and his Rolling Stones bandmates
joined the complaining chorus with a demand that the Trump
campaign cease using their recording of Start Me Up.4 During the
general election race, the Trump campaign again opted to use a
1

Andrew Flanagan, Adele Tells Trump, and Every Other Politician, to Back Off,
BILLBOARD (Feb. 1, 2016), http://www.billboard.com/articles/business/6859534/adeletrump-rolling-in-the-deep-political-campaign
[http://perma.cc/F2FU-P3GL];
Ted
Johnson, Adele Objects to Use of Her Music at Donald Trump, Other Campaign Rallies,
VARIETY (Feb. 1, 2016, 12:28 PM) http://variety.com/2016/music/news/donald-trumpadele-music-rallies-1201693891/ [http://perma.cc/4ETS-8WEV]. In addition, Adele
objected to the Trump campaign’s use of her recording of Skyfall. See Johnson, supra.
Primary-season candidates Chris Christie and Mike Huckabee also made use of songs
recorded by Adele. Flanagan, supra.
2
Ben Sisario, In Choreographed Campaigns, Candidates Stumble Over Choice of Music,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/13/us/politics/inchoreographed-campaigns-candidates-stumble-over-choice-of-music.html
[http://
perma.cc/FT5Q-4XM5].
3
Flanagan, supra note 1; Sisario, supra note 2.
4
Jenny Starrs, 5 Artists Who Told Trump to Stop Using Their Music, WASH. POST (May
5, 2016, 4:26 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/politics/5-artists-who-toldtrump-to-stop-using-their-music/2016/05/05/d8dc3926-129b-11e6-a9b5-bf703a5a7191_
video.html [http://perma.cc/U7E8-3MHU]. Perhaps surprisingly, given candidate
Trump’s practice of assigning nicknames to rival candidates, the Trump campaign did
not take advantage of what might have been golden political musical opportunities. For
instance, if the Trump campaign had run an ad critical of “low-energy” Jeb Bush, Take It
Easy (song by Jackson Browne and hit recording by the Eagles) would have been a
desirable choice. Similarly, it is surprising that the Trump campaign did not target “Lyin’
Ted” Cruz with an ad that used Lyin’ Eyes (the Eagles again). These less-than-serious
examples aside, copyright owners and performers of well-known recordings do not find it
a laughing matter when their creative works and efforts are borrowed for political
purposes. See Sisario, supra note 2.
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Stones recording, You Can’t Always Get What You Want, at a campaign event.5 Queen’s recording of We Are the Champions played in
the background as nominee Trump was introduced at the Republican National Convention—much to the chagrin of the surviving
members of the musical group.6
During the 2012 presidential primary season, Tom Petty (of
Tom Petty and the Heartbreakers) objected when Michele Bachmann’s campaign used the group’s recording of American Girl.7
Four years earlier, the campaigns of both presidential candidates in
the general election drew similar objections. Barack Obama’s campaign ceased using the recording of Hold On, I’m Comin’ at rallies
after musical artists Sam & Dave complained.8 Singer-songwriter
Jackson Browne sued John McCain’s campaign and the Republication National Commitee (“RNC”) over the campaign’s use of his
recording Running on Empty in a McCain ad.9 In addition to these,
there are many other examples of similar objection-triggering uses
of musical works.10
5

Jenna Johnson & Robert Costa, In Announcing Mike Pence, Donald Trump Talks
Mostly About Himself, WASH. POST (July 16, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/in-announcing-mike-pence-donald-trump-talks-mostly-about-himself/2016/07/
16/655eb2f4-4b75-11e6-90a8-fb84201e0645_story.html [http://perma.cc/6YM7-22YZ].
6
Mercy Yang, Queen Has No Time for Losers Like Donald Trump and the RNC,
HUFFINGTON POST (July 19, 2016, 1:33 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/
donald-trump-queen_us_578e46e6e4b0a0ae97c37e8b [http://perma.cc/U49M-L4G4].
In addition, George Harrison’s estate complained about the use of Here Comes the Sun
when Ivanka Trump was introduced at the convention. Will Drabold, Now the Beatles Are
Angry With Donald Trump For Using Their Music, TIME (July 22, 2016),
http://time.com/4418897/now-the-beatles-are-angry-with-donald-trump-for-using-theirmusic/?xid+msn [http://perma.cc/NK25-S875].
7
Jana Moser, Songs in Contention: Copyright Holders Have Begun to Challenge the
Customary Appropriation of Songs for Political Campaigns, L.A. LAW., May 2013, at 28, 29.
8
Sarah Schacter, Note, The Barracuda Lacuna: Music, Political Campaigns, and the
First Amendment, 99 GEO. L.J. 571, 579 (2011).
9
Browne’s case will receive extensive attention later in the Article. See infra text
accompanying notes 67–167, 211–57. The McCain campaign also drew objections from
Ann and Nancy Wilson, who comprised the musical duo Heart. They complained when
their hit song and recording Barracuda was used at a campaign event featuring McCain
running mate Sarah Palin. Schacter, supra note 8, at 572.
10
For listings of such examples over the years, see Michelle Lin, Keep on Rockin’ in the
Free World: Trademark Remedies for Musicians, 93 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 98,
98–99 (2011); Lauren M. Bilasz, Note, Copyrights, Campaigns, and Collective
Administration of Performance Rights: A Call to End Blanket Licensing of Political Events, 32
CARDOZO L. REV. 305, 305–07 (2010); Schacter, supra note 8, at 577–79.
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Uses of the sort noted above have caused copyright owners (of
both the musical composition and the sound recording) to threaten
legal action—and sometimes file lawsuits—against the offending
candidates, campaign organizations, or supporting groups.11 These
copyright infringement disputes usually focus on whether the use
of the musical works occurred pursuant to a blanket license12 and, if
not, whether the defendants should receive the protection of the
fair use defense.13 Importantly, however, copyright owners tend
not to be the only dissatisfied parties in the situations described.
Rather than addressing copyright issues, this Article focuses on the
legal interests of the other dissatisfied parties—those who do not
necessarily have copyright interests to enforce but feel wronged
when political candidates or supporting groups employ music in
the manner described.
Identifying those other supposedly wronged parties begins with
the recognition that when candidates, campaigns, and super PACs
use musical works for political purposes, they count on the public’s
familiarity with the chosen songs and recordings. Common sense
11

See, e.g., Henley v. DeVore, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (C.D. Cal. 2010); Browne v.
McCain, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1073 (C.D. Cal. 2009). It is important to note that a musical
composition (“song”) is one copyrighted work and the sound recording (“recording”) of
the musical composition is a separate copyrighted work. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012); U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 56A, COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION OF MUSICAL
COMPOSITIONS AND SOUND RECORDINGS (2012). The owner of the copyright to the song
and the owner of the copyright to the recording may be different parties. See John
Tehranian, Guantanamo’s Greatest Hits: The Semiotics of Sound and the Protection of
Performer Rights Under the Lanham Act, 16 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 11, 15 (2013).
12
If the use occurred at a campaign event, chances are that the venue where the event
took place obtained a blanket license from a performing rights organization. If so, a
copyright infringement claim probably would not be successful. See Tehranian, supra note
11, at 14; Bilasz, supra note 10, at 308–09; Schacter, supra note 8, at 576–77. A use in a
campaign advertisement would not be covered by a blanket license. Instead, a direct
license from the copyright owner would be necessary to avoid infringement liability
(unless, of course, a court held the use to be protected under the fair use doctrine). See
Tehranian, supra note 11, at 15.
13
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). For a discussion of fair use issues in copyright owners’
infringement claims against defendants that made political uses of musical works or
recordings, see Matthew J. Cursio, Comment, Born to Be Used in the USA: An Alternative
Avenue for Evaluating Politicians’ Unauthorized Use of Original Musical Performances on the
Campaign Trail, 18 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 317, 323–29, 358–63 (2011), and David C.
Johnston, Note, The Singer Did Not Approve This Message: Analyzing the Unauthorized Use
of Copyrighted Music in Political Advertisements in Jackson Browne v. John McCain, 27
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 687, 691–704 (2010).
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suggests that if this familiarity is lacking, the use of the musical
works may not achieve the desired effect. The necessary familiarity
with a song usually stems from a performer’s well-known rendition
of it in a recording. When a song and recording are used to advance
political objectives, the performer of the well-known rendition may
be concerned that the public will think she supports a candidate she
does not support or holds a viewpoint she does not hold.14
The concerned performer, however, will often have no copyright interest to assert regarding the song because she either did not
write it or, if she wrote it, she transferred ownership of the relevant
copyright to a music publishing firm or other entity.15 Performers
frequently perform or record songs that they did not write.16 Moreover, many who do fit in the singer-songwriter category end up
transferring their copyrights to music publishers.17 The performer
is also unlikely to own the copyright to a recording that features her
rendition of a song, because the record label usually owns the recording copyright.18
When political campaigns use song renditions without their
consent, unhappy performers complain—regardless of whether
they have any copyright interest to enforce—about the prospect
that the public may erroneously think they support or endorse the
political endeavor at issue.19 Such objections usually do not go
beyond a cease and desist letter and the out-of-court reaction to the
use—either the political user backs down, or the unresolved spat
plays out in the media.20 The performers who have formally sought
legal remedies by filing a lawsuit have invoked two key legal theories of a non-copyright nature. One is the right of publicity, as recognized under the common law or statutes in many states.21 The

14

See Tehranian, supra note 11, at 12–15, 18.
17 U.S.C. § 201(a), (d) (2012).
16
Ken Consor, What You Didn’t Know About Radio Royalties, SONGTRUST BLOG (Aug.
6, 2014), http://blog.songtrust.com/publishing-tips-2/what-you-didnt-know-about-radioroyalties/ [http://perma.cc/ZL6X-GMMD].
17
See, e.g., AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, KOHN ON MUSIC LICENSING 103–04 (4th ed. 2010).
18
Tehranian, supra note 11, at 15.
19
See, e.g., Browne v. McCain, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1065 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
20
See Sisario, supra note 2.
21
See infra text accompanying notes 34–65.
15
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other is false endorsement, under section 43(a) of the federal Lanham Act.22
In the small number of reported cases, the results have been
mixed.23 Some right of publicity case law suggests that performers
may succeed with claims regarding political uses of their musical
renditions.24 Other decisions, however, reveal judicial concerns
about whether such uses are sufficiently commercial to satisfy the
elements of a right of publicity claim and about whether—and, if
so, how—to account for First Amendment interests that may arise
in a right of publicity case regarding a political use.25 Similarly, in
section 43(a) cases, courts have offered conflicting signals about
whether plaintiffs should have valid claims against defendants engaged in political activities. Some courts have rejected such claims
by concluding that the uses at issue were insufficiently commercial
to violate the statute, and by otherwise interpreting section 43(a)
narrowly. Other courts have concluded that section 43(a) may
sometimes reach political uses, but have acknowledged uncertainty
about how to account for the First Amendment interests present in
such uses.26
Commentators have offered proposals for addressing the
questions that have troubled courts in right of publicity and false
endorsement cases of the sort noted above.27 As this Article demonstrates, however, there is another possibility: a legal theory
that performers have not invoked and commentators have not addressed as a possible cause of action for performers. One may characterize it as the forgotten tort—seemingly overlooked in the performers’ rights context and otherwise less frequently invoked today than during what once seemed a heyday in the making.28
22

See infra text accompanying notes 170–209.
The two leading cases are Browne v. McCain, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1062 (C.D. Cal. 2009),
and Henley v. DeVore, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (C.D. Cal. 2010). These cases will be
examined extensively in Parts I and II.
24
See infra text accompanying notes 46–51.
25
For discussion of the right of publicity-related disagreements and uncertainties
alluded to in this paragraph, see infra text accompanying notes 62–65, 114–69.
26
For discussion of the false endorsement-related disagreements and uncertainties
alluded to in this paragraph, see infra text accompanying notes 236–95.
27
See generally Lin, supra note 10; Tehranian, supra note 11; Schacter, supra note 8.
28
See infra text accompanying notes 296–314.
23
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This forgotten tort is false light publicity, one of the four types of
invasion of privacy identified in William Prosser’s influential article published in 1960.29 Authorities in many states recognize false
light publicity as a cause of action,30 even if other types of invasion
of privacy seem to have acquired greater prominence in recent
years. This legal cousin of defamation contains common law elements that can be applied to performers’ interests in cases of the
sort addressed in this Article.31 Moreover, roughly fifty years ago in
Time, Inc. v. Hill, the U.S. Supreme Court added First Amendment
requirements to false light publicity’s common law elements by
borrowing constitutional principles from the Court’s defamation
decisions.32 The First Amendment requirements outlined in Hill
provide familiar and sufficient protections for the speech interests
potentially at stake in performers’ cases against political candidates
and political groups.33 Therefore, the false light publicity theory
merits a close look.
The first two Parts of the Article address the two non-copyright
theories that performers have invoked when their renditions of
songs have been used for political purposes. Specifically, Part I discusses right of publicity cases, and Part II reviews false endorsement claims. Both Parts examine the mixed results and signals in
the cases, and consider the First Amendment issues that have
troubled courts. Part III furnishes background on the false light
publicity variety of invasion of privacy, and explores the Supreme
Court’s delineation of First Amendment requirements for false
light publicity in Time, Inc. v. Hill, as well as other relevant decisions. Part IV explains why the false light publicity theory may provide some performers with a basis for relief when their renditions
have been used for political purposes without their consent. Part IV
explores two notable virtues of the theory. First, because it clearly
can be applied to noncommercial uses, false light publicity eliminates the need to wrestle with some of the coverage questions that
29

William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98
CALIF. L. REV. 1887, 1901 (2010).
31
For extensive background on false light publicity, see infra text accompanying notes
296–390.
32
385 U.S. 374, 387–88, 390–91 (1967).
33
See infra text accompanying notes 359–75.
30
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have vexed courts when performers have sued on right of publicity
or false endorsement grounds. Second, because its First Amendment contours have long been established by the Supreme Court,
the theory sidesteps the First Amendment uncertainties with
which courts have struggled in right of publicity and false endorsement cases. In addition, Part IV comments on key issues that
arise under false light publicity’s common law and First Amendment aspects when performers bring such claims, and offers recommendations for the proper treatment of those issues.
I. PERFORMERS’ RIGHT OF PUBLICITY CLAIMS AGAINST
POLITICAL USERS
A. Right of Publicity Background
As recognized by common law or statutes in most states, the
right of publicity rests mainly on the notion that, through the expenditures of time and effort in honing professional talents and
skills, a celebrity develops a potentially valuable property right that
consists of her name, likeness, and identity.34 This property right
entitles the celebrity to legal relief when another party makes a
commercial use of the name, likeness, or identity without the celebrity’s consent.35 Although the right of publicity is also premised
on guarding against the public’s drawing of an erroneous conclusion that the celebrity endorses the defendant’s commercial endeavor, states that recognize the right of publicity typically do not require the plaintiff to prove actual or likely consumer confusion in
that regard.36
The right of publicity’s origins and historical development are
well documented and helpfully examined elsewhere.37 Accordingly,
34

See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY ET AL., MCCARTHY’S DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 529 (3d ed. 2004).
35
Id. at 528–31.
36
Id. at 529. However, the false endorsement theory under section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act is different. Proof of likelihood of confusion is required in false endorsement
cases. See infra text accompanying note 181.
37
See, e.g., Tara E. Langvardt, Reinforcing the Commercial-Noncommercial Distinction: A
Framework for Accommodating First Amendment Interests in the Right of Publicity, 13 VA.
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 167, 169–74 (2014).

438

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXVII:429

this Section foregoes much of the discussion of those matters and
instead emphasizes issues of particular relevance to the music use
context. One such issue deals with the scope of a celebrity’s identity for right of publicity purposes. Another such issue (or, really, set
of issues) concerns the requirement that the defendant’s use of the
plaintiff’s name, likeness, or identity must have been commercial
in nature for a violation of the right of publicity to have occurred.
The following Section takes up those issues.
As the right of publicity evolved, courts held that it went
beyond offering protection against unconsented commercial uses of
the celebrity’s name or likeness in the sense of an actual photo or
video of the plaintiff.38 Courts stretched the likeness component of
the right of publicity to offer the celebrity relief when the defendant
made a commercial use of a celebrity look-alike rather than an actual photo or video of the celebrity.39 Over time, courts also concluded that a celebrity merited right of publicity protection if the
defendant’s commercial use invoked her public identity, regardless
of whether the celebrity’s name and likeness were also used.40 Celebrities’ well-known nicknames were held to be aspects of the protected identity, as were phrases associated so strongly with a celebrity that members of the public think of the celebrity when they
hear the phrase.41
White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc. expanded the identity
concept to a greater extent than ever before.42 In White, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that Samsung employed Wheel of Fortune letter turner Vanna White’s identity in violation of her right of publicity when the company’s lighthearted
ad for its products depicted a futuristic setting in which a blondehaired, evening-gown-clad robot turned letters on a game show
set.43 Various commentators have criticized the White decision as
38

MCCARTHY ET AL., supra note 34, at 529.
Id.
40
Id.
41
See Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 836 (6th Cir. 1983)
(phrase “Here’s Johnny”); Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129, 137
(Wis. 1979) (nickname “Crazylegs”).
42
971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
43
Id. at 1399.
39
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unsound in a number of ways.44 However, the decision remains a
leading one in marking the outer boundaries of the identity concept.45
A Ninth Circuit decision that preceded White altered the
course of the right of publicity’s evolution in another important
way. In Midler v. Ford Motor Co., the Ninth Circuit departed from
past decisions addressing the use of vocal impersonators and held
that when a celebrity has a distinctive singing voice, the defendant’s commercial use of a sound-alike of the celebrity violates her
right of publicity.46 The court reasoned that if the celebrity has a
distinctive voice, the voice identifies the celebrity in the minds of
members of the public just as readily as the celebrity’s name or facial appearance does.47 The court concluded, therefore, that the
distinctive voice is a protected part of the celebrity’s identity.48
The Ninth Circuit’s decision cleared the way for Bette Midler to
win her right of publicity case against an automobile manufacturer
and an advertising agency that used a sound-alike of Midler in a
television commercial for the manufacturer’s cars.49 Midler remains a leading right of publicity precedent in the voice misappropriation context50 and, as such, is relevant to the performers’ rights
issues addressed in this Article.51
44

See, e.g., Michael G. Bennett, Celebrity Politicians and Publicity Rights in the Age of
Obama, 36 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 339, 342, 353 (2014); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark
A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn from Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV.
1161, 1178–80, 1195–97, 1217 (2006); Daniel Gervais & Martin L. Holmes, Fame, Property,
and Identity: The Scope and Purpose of the Right of Publicity, 25 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.,
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 181, 190, 194, 204–07 (2014); Langvardt, supra note 37, at 178–80.
45
See Langvardt, supra note 37, at 179.
46
849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988).
47
Id.
48
Id. For a voice to be distinctive, it must be recognizable in a variety of contexts, as
opposed to being recognizable only if one particular song was used. See id. at 461–63.
49
Id. at 461–62, 464.
50
See MCCARTHY ET AL., supra note 34, at 529. Midler provided the guiding principles
for the Ninth Circuit in another distinctive voice-based right of publicity decision. See
Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992). In Waits, the defendants used a
sound-alike of well-known singer Tom Waits to sing an advertising jingle in a radio
commercial for the defendants’ Doritos chips. Id. at 1097–98. After concluding that the
raspy-sounding Waits had a distinctive voice that was widely recognizable in the sense
outlined in Midler, id. at 1098–1102, the Ninth Circuit upheld a very substantial jury
verdict in favor of Waits on his right of publicity claim. Id. at 1102–06. Approximately
$400,000 of the total award consisted of compensatory damages for the fair market value
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The performers’ rights scenarios examined herein call for special attention to the commercial use element of a right of publicity
claim. That element presents no difficulty for courts when the facts
reveal that the defendant’s supposed violation of the right occurred
in a classic commercial use context: an advertisement for a product, service, or business (or the functional equivalent of such an
ad).52 For instance, the White and Midler cases arose in such a context.53 Another classic example of a commercial use occurs when
the defendant uses the plaintiff-celebrity’s name or identity
attribute as the name or designation of the defendant’s product or
business.54 Effectively turning the celebrity into a product—as
would occur when the defendant produces and sells a poster that
consists of a photo of the celebrity—is also a commercial use.55
The commercial use determination, however, is not always so
easy to make. Some uses may seem to have commercial characteristics as well as characteristics that may point in another direcof his services, for loss of goodwill and professional standing, and for harm to his “peace,
happiness, and feelings.” Id. at 1103. In addition, the jury assessed $2 million in punitive
damages. Id. at 1104. Waits also sued on false endorsement grounds. Id. at 1106–11. That
aspect of the case is discussed later in this Article. See infra text accompanying notes 193–
208. Some courts limit the distinctive voice holdings of Midler and Waits to cases
involving voice impersonations as opposed to the use of celebrities’ actual voices. See
Butler v. Target Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1056 (C.D. Cal. 2004); Edwards v. Church
of God in Christ, No. 220348, 2002 Mich. App. LEXIS 2390, at *4–5 (Mar. 8, 2002); see
also Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1135–36, 1139–41 (9th Cir. 2006)
(resting decision on preemption ground, but suggesting that voice misappropriation
claims may be restricted to instances of impersonations). Given that broad identifiability
of the voice is critical to the analysis in Midler and Waits, see supra note 48, the better
approach treats a distinctive-voice-based right of publicity claim as appropriate where the
defendant made a commercial use of the celebrity’s distinctive voice, regardless of
whether the use was of the actual voice or of a sound-alike who impersonated the
celebrity. See infra text accompanying notes 121–26.
51
See infra text accompanying notes 94–96, 121–227.
52
Langvardt, supra note 37, at 173.
53
See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992); Midler,
849 F.2d at 461–62; see also Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 409 (9th
Cir. 1996) (concerning the use of legendary basketball player’s former name in a
television commercial).
54
See, e.g., Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 833–37 (6th
Cir. 1983).
55
See, e.g., Winterland Concessions Co. v. Trela, 735 F.2d 257, 259–60 (7th Cir. 1984);
see also Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 867–68 (2d Cir.
1953) (concluding that a photograph of a baseball player constituted a commercial use).
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tion.56 It is important to note, therefore, that many uses for which
there is an underlying profit motive are classified as noncommercial, rather than commercial, for right of publicity purposes. Books,
movies, television shows, plays, newspapers, magazines, musical
works, visual art, and other expressive works all have underlying
profit-making motivations, but they are normally classified as noncommercial on the theory that their aspects related to information,
educational, creative, or entertainment outweigh the financial motives.57 Even when sales occur in the context of such uses, what is
being promoted or sold is speech, rather than a product, for right of
publicity purposes and, importantly, for First Amendment purposes.58 When speech itself is sold—as in the case of a book—a noncommercial use presumably has occurred.59 This example contrasts
with advertisements of the sort at issue in cases such as White and
Midler. The advertisements in those cases were clearly commercial
in nature because, rather than promoting the sale of speech, they
promoted the sale of products (electronic equipment in White and
cars in Midler).60
Therefore, if the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s name, likeness, or identity occurred in a noncommercial context (say, a magazine story about a celebrity’s path to stardom), the plaintiff will
usually lose her right of publicity claim.61 Sometimes courts find
that the right of publicity claim fails because the noncommercial
nature of the use means that a key element of the claim has not
been satisfied.62 Other times, because the commercial-versus56

See, e.g., Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001)
(involving T-shirts bearing a likeness of The Three Stooges that were reproduced from a
charcoal drawing). For discussion of Comedy III, see infra text accompanying notes 107–
08.
57
Langvardt, supra note 37, at 174–75.
58
See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50–57 (1988); Joseph Burstyn,
Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501–02 (1952).
59
Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 440 (5th Cir. 1994); Hicks v. Casablanca
Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 430–33 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
60
See supra text accompanying notes 43, 49.
61
See, e.g., New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 309–10
(9th Cir. 1992). But see Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 574–76
(allowing liability to be imposed based on a fifteen-seconds-long film broadcast on a
television newscast because the clip showed the performer’s entire act).
62
See, e.g., New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 309–10; Jackson v. MPI Home Video, 694
F. Supp. 483, 492 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
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noncommercial inquiry under the right of publicity basically tracks
the commercial speech versus noncommercial speech inquiry under the First Amendment,63 courts conclude that the right of publicity claim fails because the defendant is entitled to the very substantial First Amendment protection accorded to noncommercial
speech.64
The degree of First Amendment protection for noncommercial
speech suggests questions about the contexts addressed in this Article: political advertisements and campaign events meant to promote candidates who are seeking election to public office. Can a
celebrity’s right of publicity be violated when her name, likeness,
or identity is used in such a context? Is the context sufficiently
commercial to satisfy a key element of a right of publicity claim,
considering the likelihood that those responsible for the advertisements and events hope to inspire not only voters, but also those
who might contribute financially to the candidate’s campaign or to
a like-minded group? On the other hand, if books, movies, and the
like are considered noncommercial for right of publicity purposes
despite their underlying profit motives, should not the same be true
of the political uses addressed herein, given the indirect (at most)
financial motivations and the very high value placed on political
speech in First Amendment jurisprudence?65 Browne v. McCain,
the right of publicity case most directly relevant to the performers’
rights scenarios addressed in this Article, speaks to these issues and
serves as the subject of the next Section.66

63

Commercial speech receives an intermediate level of First Amendment protection if
it is not misleading and about a lawful activity, but receives no First Amendment
protection if it misleads or promotes an unlawful activity. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 760–63, 765, 769–71 (1976).
Noncommercial speech, on the other hand, receives a very substantial level of protection
known as “full” First Amendment protection. See Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.,
255 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S.
786, 790–91, 799 (2011).
64
See, e.g., Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1186–89.
65
See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 329, 339–40 (2010); Eu
v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989).
66
611 F. Supp. 2d 1062 (C.D. Cal. 2009). The court dealt with other aspects of the case
in separate opinions that bore the same date. See infra text accompanying notes 80–82.
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B. The Right of Publicity Claim in Browne v. McCain
With the 2008 presidential campaign in full swing, the RNC
and the Ohio Republican Party (“ORP”) created and publicly disseminated a web video that expressly supported the Republican
nominee, Senator McCain, and commented unfavorably on his
Democratic opponent, then-Senator Obama.67 The video focused
on the two candidates’ energy policies and portrayed the Obama
policy as weak and ineffectual in comparison to the McCain policy.68
Partway through the video, as content critical of the Obama
energy policy appeared, instrumental music played in the background.69 The music was the introduction from Jackson Browne’s
recording of Running on Empty,70 a major hit for the singersongwriter in 1977 and a key element of his identically titled, platinum-status album.71 The instrumental music from the recording
continued at differing volumes for roughly twenty seconds.72 Near
the end of the video, as the words “Barack Obama: Not Ready to
Lead” appeared, another portion of the Running on Empty recording could be heard.73 This time, it was Browne’s voice as he sang
the song’s familiar chorus.74
The RNC, the ORP, and the McCain campaign did not have
Browne’s consent for the use of any portion of Running on Empty in
the video.75 This fact did not sit well with Browne, who (as the
court noted in its decision) supported then-candidate Obama and
67

Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1066–67. ORP posted the video on YouTube. The video
also appeared on other websites and on television and cable networks in Ohio and
Pennsylvania. In addition, the national news media reported on, aired, and discussed the
video. Id. at 1067.
68
Id. at 1066–67.
69
Id. at 1066.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 1065. The court noted that because platinum status for an album is acquired
through the sale of a million copies, Browne’s album had actually acquired that status
seven times over. Id. The court observed that the identically titled song and album “are
both famously associated with Browne.” Id.
72
Id. at 1066.
73
Id. at 1067.
74
Id. The lyrics of the chorus are: “Running on—running on empty, Running on—
running blind, Running on—running into the sun, But I’m running behind.” Id. at 1066.
75
Id. at 1067.
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was “closely associated with liberal causes and Democratic political candidates.”76 Only ten days after the video’s public release,
Browne sued the RNC, the ORP, and Senator McCain in federal
court in California.77
Browne pleaded three claims in his lawsuit: copyright infringement, violation of his right of publicity under California common
law, and false endorsement under section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act.78 He succeeded in fending off the defendants’ attempts to
have the case dismissed at an early stage.79 In a series of opinions
issued on the same date, the court denied the motions of the RNC
and Senator McCain to strike the right of publicity claim,80 and denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim
on the copyright infringement81 and false endorsement causes of
76

Id. at 1065. Browne’s support of Democratic candidates included performances at
their political rallies. Id.
77
Id. at 1067.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 1067–68.
80
Id. at 1073. As for the third defendant Browne sued, the ORP, the court issued a
separate opinion in which it granted that defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction. Browne v. McCain, 612 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1121 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
81
Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1073, 1078 (denying McCain’s motion to dismiss
copyright infringement claim); Browne, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1131 (denying RNC’s motion
to dismiss copyright infringement claim). The fact that Browne wrote the song at issue
and was its copyright owner enabled him to add a copyright infringement claim to the
mix—something many performers cannot do. As noted earlier, performers who provide a
rendition of a song on a recording often have no copyright interest to invoke because they
did not write the song. See supra text accompanying note 15. Of course, such performers
may, in appropriate instances, seek to bring the other claims included in Browne v. McCain
(right of publicity and false endorsement), as well as the claim for which this Article
advocates rejuvenated status (false light publicity). See infra text accompanying notes
391–431. This Article’s focus on non-copyright causes of action for performers means
that detailed examination of copyright claims and issues is beyond the scope of the
Article. Thus, only a brief review of the Browne court’s treatment of the copyright
infringement claim is warranted here. Because the defendants had no license from
Browne to use his copyrighted work in their web video, their only real chance of having
the copyright infringement claim dismissed at such an early stage in the case would have
been to convince the court that the fair use defense should protect them against liability.
See Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1077. However, the court declined to conduct a full fair use
analysis, reasoning that it would be premature to do so at the motion to dismiss (and
therefore pre-discovery) stage. Id. at 107; Browne, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1130–31. Still, the
court did note that the defendants “ha[d] not established that Plaintiff’s claim is barred,
as a matter of law, under the fair use doctrine.” Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1078; Browne,
612 F. Supp. 2d at 1130. The court added that “[t]he mere fact that Plaintiff’s claim is
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action.82 Because the parties then settled their dispute,83 there was
no final ruling on the merits. This Section examines the court’s
treatment of the right of publicity claim, and Section II.B. discusses
the false endorsement aspect of the case.84
The RNC and Senator McCain based their motion to strike
Browne’s right of publicity claim on California’s anti-SLAPP statute,85 which provides a mechanism for early-stage dismissal of
unmeritorious cases that arise from a defendant’s exercise of free
speech rights in regard to a matter of public interest.86 The court
concluded that the defendants had met their anti-SLAPP burden of
showing that Browne’s claim pertained to their speech-related activity regarding matters of public interest (the presidential election
and the candidates’ energy policies).87 This meant that the burden
shifted to Browne.88 To resist the anti-SLAPP motion, he needed
to demonstrate a probability of success on his right of publicity

based on Defendants’ use of his copyrighted work in a political campaign does not bar
Plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law.” Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1078; Browne, 612 F.
Supp. 2d at 1130.
82
Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1078–81; Browne, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1131–33. For a more
detailed discussion of the court’s treatment of the false endorsement claim, see infra text
accompanying notes 210–57.
83
Maral Vahdani, Comment, Running on Empty: The Problem with Politicians and
Stealing (Music), 32 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 75, 77 (2011).
84
See infra text accompanying notes 210–57.
85
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2015). “SLAPP” stands for “strategic
lawsuits against public participation.”
86
Id.; Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1067–68. The free speech rights at issue may be
protected under either the First Amendment or the California Constitution. Browne, 611
F. Supp. 2d at 1067. The anti-SLAPP statute was enacted because of concern that
plaintiffs may sometimes initiate litigation in order to squelch speech about matters of
public interest, despite the constitutional protection such speech should have. See Baral v.
Schnitt, 376 P.3d 604, 606, 608, 614–15 (Cal. 2016). Accordingly, the statute creates the
prospect for early-stage dismissal of an unmeritorious case that likely would impinge upon
free speech rights. A defendant seeking the benefit of the anti-SLAPP statute files a
special motion to strike the plaintiff’s claim and makes an initial showing that the
plaintiff’s claim pertains to the defendant’s speech on a matter of public interest. CIV.
PROC. § 425.16; see Baral, 376 P.3d at 608, 617. To avoid dismissal under the statute, the
plaintiff must then demonstrate a probability of success on the claim. The case will be
dismissed if the plaintiff does not so demonstrate, but if the plaintiff makes this showing,
the case can go forward. CIV. PROC. § 425.16; see Baral, 376 P.3d at 608, 617.
87
Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1068.
88
Id. at 1068–69.

446

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXVII:429

cause of action.89 After preliminary discussion of the appropriate
meaning of “probability” for purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute,90
the court turned its attention to Browne’s chances of prevailing on
right of publicity grounds.
California recognizes both a common law right of publicity and
a statutory right of publicity, and permits one who cannot bring a
statutory claim to invoke the common law variety.91 This was important in Browne, because the plaintiffs’ claim was of the common
law variety. Browne did not bring a statutory right of publicity
claim,92 presumably because the relevant statute contains language
exempting claims based on would-be defendants’ use of voices in
connection with political campaigns.93
The Browne court noted that in order to make out his common
law right of publicity claim, the plaintiff needed to show that the
defendants used his name, likeness, or identity without his consent
for their “advantage, commercially or otherwise,” and that the defendants’ actions caused injury to him.94 The court concluded that
Browne had proven a use of his identity in the defendants’ video

89

Id.; see CIV. PROC. § 425.16(b)(1).
The court noted that “the term ‘probability’ is susceptible to more than one
meaning, which is problematic in this case where the outcome of [the defendants’]
[m]otion depends on which meaning the Court adopts.” Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1069.
One meaning would require Browne to show “a strong likelihood (i.e., more than fifty
percent) that he will succeed,” whereas a more lenient meaning would require only that
he demonstrate a “mere possibility” of success. Id. Relying on authority interpreting the
anti-SLAPP statute as authorizing the striking of a claim only if it “arises from protected
speech or petitioning and lacks even minimal merit,” id. (quoting Navellier v. Sletten, 52
P.3d 703, 708 (Cal. 2002)), the court concluded that the more lenient meaning of
“probability” would apply and that Browne therefore would have to show only a “mere
possibility of success on his claim” in order to defeat the anti-SLAPP motion. Id. As will
be seen, this discussion of the meaning of “probability” is potentially important to an
understanding of what to make of the court’s decision in Browne. See infra notes 117–19
and accompanying text.
91
White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992); Midler v.
Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988); Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1069 n.3.
92
Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1069 n.3.
93
See id.; see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 2016) (providing a statutory right of
publicity). That language probably would have barred Browne from winning a statutory
claim against the RNC and McCain. See id.
94
Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1069 (quoting White, 971 F.2d at 1397).
90
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(which the court referred to as “the Commercial” in its analysis).95
In particular, the court noted Browne’s presentation of “evidence
that tends to show that his voice is sufficiently distinctive and widely known that, in light of the . . . success [of the musical composition Running on Empty], its use in the Commercial could constitute
use of his identity.”96
According to the court, Browne met his burden of demonstrating that without his consent, the defendants “appropriated his
identity to [their] advantage” by seeking and perhaps obtaining
“increased media attention for Senator McCain’s candidacy.”97
The court also stated that Browne had made a sufficient showing of
injury resulting from the use of his identity, in the sense that the
use of the musical composition in the video “gave the false impression that he was associated with or endorsed” the McCain campaign.98 Therefore, the court concluded that Browne had made a
sufficient showing regarding each element of his right of publicity
claim.99
The court then turned to the defenses raised by the RNC and
McCain. They first sought application of the public interest defense, which bars a right of publicity claim if the defendant’s use of
the plaintiff’s identity was for news reporting purposes or similar
public interest purposes.100 The court rejected this argument, noting that even though the presidential campaign was obviously a
matter of public interest, the defendants had not demonstrated
how their use of Browne’s identity was a matter of public interest.101
95

Id. at 1070. Earlier, the court had noted that the Running on Empty song and album
“are both famously associated with Browne.” Id. at 1065.
96
Id. at 1070. In so holding regarding the use of Browne’s voice, the court expressly
relied on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Midler. Id. at 1070 n.5 (citing Midler, 849 F.2d at
463). For discussion of Midler and its role in establishing that a celebrity’s distinctive
voice may be part of her identity for right of publicity purposes, see supra notes 46–51 and
accompanying text.
97
Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1070.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 1071.
100
Id.
101
Id. The court noted that courts are more inclined to give credence to the public
interest defense “when the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s identity actually targets the
plaintiff or matters related to the plaintiff.” Id. The defendants’ video did not single out
Browne for commentary or criticism. Id. Instead, the defendants simply used Browne’s
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Next, the court engaged in a brief treatment of the defendants’
second argument: Their video was political speech, so the First
Amendment should protect them against potential liability.102 After
stating that “political expression and speech uttered during a campaign for public office enjoys broad First Amendment protection,”103 the court quickly followed up with the observation that
“[i]f . . . such speech is false or misleading, it enjoys diminished
protection.”104 According to the court, the defendants “ha[ve] not
shown that political expression’s broad First Amendment protection bars, as a matter of law, all actions based on allegedly improper
identity as an aid in communicating their pro-McCain/anti-Obama message. Id. at 1071–
72.
102
Id. at 1072. The court’s devotion of only three short paragraphs to the First
Amendment discussion likely stemmed from the motion-to-strike posture in which the
case came to the court. See id. One assumes that if the court had been ruling on the
merits, it would have explored the First Amendment issues more fully.
103
Id.
104
Id. (citing Solano v. Playgirl, Inc., 292 F.3d 1078, 1089 (9th Cir. 2002)). As authority
for this statement, the court included a citation to Solano v. Playgirl, Inc., in which the
Ninth Circuit held that the defendant should not have been granted summary judgment
on the plaintiff’s false light publicity and right of publicity claims concerning the use of his
name and likeness in a way that created an impression the defendant knew was false. 292
F.3d at 1080–81, 1090. Taken literally, the statement quoted in the text asserts that the
First Amendment protection for noncommercial speech is automatically diminished if the
speech is false or misleading. See Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1072. But that assertion
would not be an accurate statement of controlling First Amendment principles. Political
speech and other forms of noncommercial speech receive the highest level of First
Amendment protection (often known as full First Amendment protection). See Hoffman
v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Brown v. Entm’t
Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790–91, 799 (2011); Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 329, 339–40 (2010). This is so, as a general rule, even if the
speech is false or misleading. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544
(2012) (noting that there is no “general exception to the First Amendment for false
statements”). Presumably what the Browne court meant to say in the statement quoted in
the text is that despite the full First Amendment protection extended to noncommercial
speech and the lack of a general falsehood exception to that protection, there are certain
instances in which the maker of false statements may be held liable—for instance, when
the plaintiff proves that the speaker made his statements with knowledge of their falsity or
with reckless disregard for the truth. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270–
71, 279–80 (1964) (holding that the First Amendment protects the publication of false
statements about public officials unless the statement was made with actual malice,
defined as knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth); Solano, 292 F.3d at
1084–87 (applying actual malice requirement in false light publicity case). Actual malice
issues will be explored more fully in later sections dealing with false light publicity claims.
See infra notes 358–90 and accompanying text.

2017]

THE FORGOTTEN TORT

449

use of a person’s identity in campaign-related materials.”105 The
defendants’ argument for First Amendment protection struck the
court as too sweeping and “particularly [unwarranted] in light of
Browne’s allegation that the Commercial gave the misleading impression that Browne endorsed Senator McCain’s candidacy.”106
As their third defense, the RNC and McCain sought protection
against liability under a test devised in Comedy III Productions, Inc.
v. Gary Saderup, Inc., a 2001 case in which the Supreme Court of
California weighed the property interests safeguarded by the right
of publicity against the First Amendment protection normally extended to visual artists.107 In Comedy III, the court struck the balance by holding that if the defendant artist’s work amounted only
to a literal reproduction of the plaintiff celebrity’s likeness, the artist could be held liable for a right of publicity violation, but that if
the work went beyond mere reproduction of the plaintiff’s likeness
and was transformative in the sense of adding new creative content, the artist would not be liable.108 The defendants in Browne argued that including the plaintiff’s song and recording in the campaign video amounted to a transformative use for which there
should be no liability.109
The Browne court applied the transformative use test, but not
with the result that the RNC and McCain wanted.110 The court
noted that “a transformative use contemplates actual transformation of a celebrity’s likeness so that it becomes the defendant’s own
105

Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1072. The court thus reasoned that the political campaign
context of the defendants’ use of Browne’s identity was not enough by itself to warrant
First Amendment protection against liability. Id.
106
Id.
107
21 P.3d 797, 802–05 (Cal. 2001).
108
Id. at 807–10. In the case, the defendant, Gary Saderup, created a charcoal drawing
of The Three Stooges and sold the drawing in the form of lithographs and T-shirts to
which he had transferred the image. Id. at 800–01. Applying its test, the court concluded
that even though it took considerable artistic skill to produce an accurate drawing
featuring the comedy trio’s facial appearances, the drawing was a literal depiction that
relied almost exclusively on the likenesses of The Three Stooges. Id. at 810–11. The
drawing was not transformative because it did not add significant creative content to the
depiction of the comedy trio in the sense that, say, a caricature might have. Id. at 811.
Because the drawing was not transformative, Saderup was held liable to Comedy III, the
owner of the deceased stars’ rights of publicity. Id.
109
Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1071–72.
110
Id. at 1072–73.
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expression.”111 Because the defendants’ video “contained a verbatim copy of portions of [the recording] containing Browne’s
voice”112 and because the portions of the song and recording used
in the video “were not altered in any way,” the defendants had not
shown their use to be transformative.113
C. Examining Browne Alongside Other Relevant Decisions
Given the court’s treatment of the right of publicity claim,
Browne v. McCain is clearly the key decision on which a performer
would rely if she brought a right of publicity claim against those
who used her identity in the context of a political ad or campaign
event. The court adopted a performer-friendly view of the identity
concept for purposes of the right of publicity claim’s elements114
and declined to hold that the political context of the defendant’s
use automatically triggers a First Amendment defense that trumps
(no pun intended) the performer’s rights.115 The court also demonstrated considerable willingness to seek a suitable balance between
the plaintiff’s property rights and the competing interests of political users of the performer’s identity.116 From the standpoint of
would-be plaintiffs in right of publicity cases, these features of
Browne are major advantages. But there are reasons why performers should not be unrestrainedly enthusiastic about Browne. Some
reasons stem from the posture of the case when the court issued its
ruling; others derive from the probability that not all courts would
be comfortable with ruling as the court did in Browne. This Section
explores both the positive and negative features of Browne.
It is important to remember that the Browne court’s treatment
of the right of publicity claim came in the context of a ruling on the
defendant’s motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute. To resist that motion, Browne needed to demonstrate a probability of success on his right of publicity claim.117 Because the
court determined that the anti-SLAPP statute and cases interpret111
112
113
114
115
116
117

Id. at 1072.
Id. at 1072–73.
Id. at 1073.
See id. at 1069–70.
See id. at 1072.
See id.
Id. at 1068–69.
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ing it contemplated a lenient meaning for probability, Browne
needed only to prove a possibility of success to fend off the motion
to strike.118
Therefore, in deciding whether Browne satisfied the elements
of a right of publicity claim, the court was applying a low standard.
Would the court have ruled differently if it had been applying the
preponderance of the evidence standard (which requires more than
a mere possibility)? One statement by the court before it began its
right of publicity analysis might so suggest, but it seems likely that
the court did not intend to communicate such a message.119 Even
so, the prospect that the court might have viewed Browne’s right
of publicity claim differently under a higher standard should not be
discounted.
Moreover, the fact that the court was not ruling on the merits
may have affected its analysis—or at least the extent of its analysis—of the First Amendment issues. In the brief portion of the opinion dealing with those issues, the court suggested that in the pretrial context in which it was ruling, it was not inclined to conduct a
full-blown First Amendment analysis.120 It is conceivable, but obviously by no means certain, that the court might have ruled differently on the First Amendment question if it had been ruling on the
merits.
The court’s conclusion that Browne possessed a distinctive
voice that was part of his protected identity for right of publicity
purposes121 contemplated a broad scope for the identity concept.
Importantly, the court’s reliance on Midler v. Ford Co.,122 as sup-

118

Id. at 1069; see supra note 90.
The court stated that “the term ‘probability’ is susceptible to more than one
meaning, which is problematic in this case where the outcome of [the defendants’] motion
depends on which meaning the [c]ourt adopts.” Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1069 (emphasis
added). Although this language could be read as an indication that the court would have
ruled against Browne if it had been applying a higher standard of proof, the court’s later
analysis was very favorable to Browne and provided no further indications that the court
was ruling in his favor only because the standard of proof was so low. See id. at 1070–73.
120
See id. at 1072 (noting that “at this point,” the defendants had not shown that the
First Amendment should bar Browne’s claim).
121
Id. at 1070 & n.5.
122
849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
119
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porting authority for its distinctive voice ruling,123 suggested that
the court was not inclined to read Midler narrowly and hold that it
applies only in voice impersonation cases. Some courts have interpreted Midler that way, probably because the case’s facts involved
the use of a Midler sound-alike rather than Midler’s actual voice.124
The Browne court’s apparent reading of Midler—applying that decision to the actual-voice context in Browne—seems to be the better
one.125 If, as Midler held, a celebrity’s distinctive voice identifies
her in the public’s mind just as readily as her name or a photo of
her would,126 that identification surely would occur just as readily
when the celebrity’s actual voice is used as when a sound-alike is
used (if not more so than when the sound-alike is used). So, the
Browne court probably was correct, but the real point here is that
not all courts would agree.127 In the absence of greater agreement
123

Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1070. Midler indicated that a celebrity has a distinctive
voice only if it is readily recognizable by the public regardless of what else was being used,
as opposed to an instance in which the voice was recognizable only in the context of a
particular song. Midler, 849 F.2d at 461–63. Compare Midler, 849 F.2d at 461–63 (finding
true distinctive voice because recognizable regardless of song being used), with Sinatra v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711, 712–13, 716–17 (9th Cir. 1970) (concluding
not a distinctive voice because probably not recognizable outside context of one particular
song). In holding that Browne had sufficiently shown that he has a distinctive voice, the
court apparently concluded that the voice’s identifiability was not tied to the particular
song used in the McCain ad. “[A]pparently concluded” is probably all that can be said
here, however, because the court did make various references to the particular song and
recording used by the defendant (Running on Empty) when it discussed Browne’s claim to
a distinctive voice. See Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1065, 1067, 1070–71. Even so, it does
seem likely that a court would find his voice to be readily identifiable even in the context
of a song or recording other than Running on Empty, given Browne’s long career and
recording success. Browne has been inducted into the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and the
Songwriters’ Hall of Fame. He has released fourteen studio albums and four albums of
live performances. See Biography, JACKSON BROWNE, http://www.jacksonbrowne.
com/biography [https://perma.cc/2UAA-HM24] (last visited Mar. 7, 2017).
124
See Butler v. Target Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1056 (C.D. Cal. 2004); Edwards v.
Church of God in Christ, No. 220348, 2002 Mich. App. LEXIS 2390, at *4–5 (Mar. 8,
2002); see also Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1135–36, 1139–41 (9th
Cir. 2006) (suggesting that voice misappropriation claims may be restricted to instances
of impersonations).
125
See Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1070; see also Oliveira v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 251 F.3d 56,
63–64 (2d Cir. 2001) (permitting right of publicity claim to go forward when defendant’s
television commercial used recording that featured plaintiff’s actual voice). For
discussion of other issues in Oliveira, see infra text accompanying notes 272–89.
126
Midler, 849 F.2d at 463.
127
See, e.g., Butler, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 1056.
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on this question, performers may not be able to count on the ability
to succeed with a right of publicity claim when their voices are used
for political purposes.128
The Browne court’s decision also provided, at least in the pretrial posture of the case, favorable treatment for the plaintiff on two
related questions: whether right of publicity liability could be established in regard to a political ad; and whether the First Amendment
128

Another point of potential uncertainty concerns the possibility of federal preemption
when the use of a copyrighted song is part of a right of publicity case’s facts. Section 301
of the Copyright Act provides that a plaintiff’s state-law-based claim (such as the right of
publicity) is preempted by the Copyright Act if the plaintiff asserts rights over a work
fixed in a tangible medium of expression (and thus within the scope of the Copyright Act)
and the state-law-based claim, if allowed to proceed, would grant a right equivalent to a
right granted to copyright owners. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2012). Courts have struggled at times
in determining whether preemption is mandated, either under the express preemption
provision in section 301 or under principles of implied preemption, in a performer’s right
of publicity case that has the use of a copyrighted song as part of the facts. Sometimes
courts have ruled that the plaintiff’s claim is preempted. See, e.g., Laws, 448 F.3d at 1135,
1137–45; Butler, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 1055–57. A key issue, however, is whether the plaintiff
has a true distinctive voice in the sense of being recognizable by the public regardless of
the song used (i.e., even if the defendant had used a song other than the copyrighted song
the defendant actually used). Midler, 849 F.2d at 461–63. If so, the plaintiff is legitimately
claiming rights over her voice, as opposed to the particular copyrighted song used by the
defendant—meaning that the plaintiff’s claim would not be preempted. See id. at 462.
However, if the voice is recognizable only in the context of the particular song used by the
defendant, the plaintiff is effectively claiming rights in that particular song and her right of
publicity claim, therefore, is preempted. See Sinatra, 435 F.2d at 712–13, 716–17; Butler,
323 F. Supp. 2d at 1055–57. Courts also hold that section 301 of the Copyright Act will
not preempt a state-law-based claim if that claim calls for proof of an additional element
beyond what must be proven in a copyright infringement case. See, e.g., Forest Park
Pictures v. Universal Television Network, Inc., 683 F.3d 424, 430–32 (2d Cir. 2012);
Montz v. Pilgrim Films & Television, Inc., 649 F.3d 975, 980–81 (9th Cir. 2011); Facenda
v. NFL Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1027–31 (3d Cir. 2008). In Facenda, for instance, the
court held that the voice misappropriation-related right of publicity claim at issue—a
claim based on use of recording of the actual voice of the plaintiff’s decedent—required
proof of an extra element and therefore was not preempted under section 301. Id. at 1027–
31. The court also concluded that implied preemption was not appropriate either. Id. In
Browne, the court did not discuss preemption, but the fact that the court let Browne’s
case go forward would seem to suggest that the court did not think his case was a
candidate for preemption. Given the court’s holding that he had a distinctive voice
(presumably in the Midler sense described above), the court was correct in apparently
concluding that preemption should not occur. See Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1070. Again,
even if the Browne court correctly concluded that preemption should not occur, the
relevant point here is that other courts—rightly or wrongly—might come to a different
conclusion on Browne-like facts. This prospect underscores the unpredictability of right of
publicity claims in performers’ cases of the sort examined here.
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should protect the defendants against liability.129 In responding yes
to the first question and no (or, perhaps more accurately, not at this
stage in the proceedings) to the second,130 the court offered answers
that California law facilitated in ways other states’ law might not
have. The usual insistence for right of publicity purposes on
whether the defendant made a commercial use131 may be less rigid
under California law because of cases indicating that an element of
the claim is whether the defendant appropriated the plaintiff’s
name, likeness, or identity “to [the] defendant’s advantage, commercially or otherwise.”132 The “or otherwise” formulation of a key
right of publicity element enabled the Browne court to conclude
that in using the plaintiff’s identity, the defendants gained the requisite advantage by drawing greater attention to Senator
McCain’s campaign for the presidency133 (something that would
not seem commercial in the usual sense of an ad for a product, service, or business).134
California case law also indicates that some uses traditionally
regarded as noncommercial may trigger right of publicity liability if
they employed a literal, non-transformative depiction of the plaintiff’s likeness or identity.135 That rule, when articulated in Comedy
III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., led to right of publicity
liability against a visual artist even though works of art are usually
considered noncommercial in nature.136 The Comedy III approach
also led to the Browne court’s conclusion that the defendants were
potentially liable for their non-transformative use of the plaintiff’s
identity in a political ad137 (again, not a classic commercial use in
the sense that an ad for a product, service, or business would be.)138
Other courts, perhaps applying another state’s law that might not
afford as much flexibility as California law on this element, could
129

Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1072.
See id.
131
See supra text accompanying notes 35–36, 52–59.
132
Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1069 (emphasis added) (quoting White v. Samsung Elecs.
Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992)).
133
Id. at 1070.
134
See supra text accompanying notes 52–53.
135
Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 807–11 (Cal. 2001).
136
Id. at 811.
137
Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1072–73.
138
See supra text accompanying notes 52–53.
130
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be less inclined to regard a political ad such as the one in Browne as
sufficiently commercial for right of publicity purposes.139
Then there is the matter of California’s two options—one statutory and one common law—for establishing right of publicity liability.140 The statutory option would not have worked for Browne
because of the applicable statute’s exemption for uses of a celebrity’s voice in a political campaign.141 With no precedent seeming to
establish a similar political-use exemption from liability when the
plaintiff sued on the basis of the common law right of publicity,
Browne was free to choose the common-law route.142
But should the statutory and common-law varieties of the right
of publicity treat political campaigns’ uses of plaintiffs’ (or wouldbe plaintiffs’) voices differently? This question suggests a need to
think about why the political-use exemption appears in the California statute. A cynic might say that because the California lawmakers are politicians, they wanted the exemption in the statute so that
they would be free to use celebrities’ voices in their political ads
and not have to worry about right of publicity liability. Although
one cannot completely dismiss that possibility, a better explanation
emerges when cynicism is set aside: It seems likely that the placement of the political-use exemption in the statute stemmed from a
desire to keep the statutory cause of action within permissible First
Amendment bounds, given the lofty status that political speech
usually holds in the free speech realm.143
If First Amendment concerns motivated the legislature to include the political-use exemption in the statute, it can be argued
credibly that courts construing the common-law variety of a right
of publicity claim should have similar concerns, unless the legisla139

Cf. MasterCard Int’l, Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Comm., Inc., No. 00 Civ. 6068
(GBD), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3644, at *22–29 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 8, 2004) (holding that
defendant political campaign’s use of plaintiff company’s trademarks in political ad was
noncommercial use that could not give rise to valid claim for trademark dilution).
140
White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992); Midler v.
Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988); Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1069 n.3;
see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 2016) (providing a statutory right of publicity).
141
See Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1069 n.3; CIV. § 3344.
142
Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1069 n.3.
143
See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790–91, 799 (2011); Citizens
United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 329, 339–40 (2010).
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ture was overvaluing the potentially affected speech and misapplying First Amendment principles. The familiar notion that political
speech rights lie at the core of the First Amendment144 suggests,
however, that the legislature’s inclusion of the political-use exemption did not stem from a distorted sense of what the First Amendment does or should protect. The Browne court’s brief treatment
and rejection of the defendants’ First Amendment argument did
not indicate that the court found it difficult to resolve the conflict
between property rights and speech rights, but it must be kept in
mind that the court was weighing in at an early stage in the proceedings and probably was hesitant to offer a sweeping free speech
ruling of the sort the defendants wanted.145 Had it ruled on the merits, the court might or might not have come out the same way on
the political speech question. But, at the very least, the court would
have analyzed the question more fully and would have found it a
close one.
The closeness of this question also suggests that some courts
deciding right of publicity cases with facts similar to those in
Browne could answer it by placing greater weight on the noncommercial use/free speech side of the scale. For instance, in Hoffman
v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., a right of publicity decision the Browne
court probably would have had to address if Browne had proceeded
to a ruling-on-the-merits stage,146 the Ninth Circuit concluded that
a magazine engaged in noncommercial speech when it used an altered photo of actor Dustin Hoffman (the plaintiff) in connection
with a lighthearted feature story on fashion trends.147 That determination probably would have caused some courts to rule against
the plaintiff on the ground that noncommercial uses do not violate
the right of publicity.148 In keeping with California law, however,
the Ninth Circuit did not regard the noncommercial character of
the use as automatically fatal to Hoffman’s right of publicity
144

See, e.g., Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989).
See Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1072 (noting that “at this point,” the defendants had
not shown that the First Amendment should bar Browne’s claim).
146
Browne was decided by the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California,
which is subject to rulings by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Hoffman was a Ninth
Circuit decision.
147
255 F.3d 1180, 1182–83, 1186 (9th Cir. 2001).
148
See supra text accompanying notes 56–64.
145
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claim.149 Instead, the court held that because the magazine feature
story and accompanying pictures were noncommercial speech, and
therefore highly valued under the First Amendment,150 Hoffman
needed to prove actual malice—a stern First Amendment-based
fault requirement—in order to win the case.151 Unable to establish
actual malice, Hoffman lost.152
For courts considering right of publicity cases in which celebrities complain about uses of their identities in political ads, or in
connection with political events, Hoffman could be especially influential. They could credibly reason that if a magazine’s entertainment-oriented feature deserves the highest level of First
Amendment protection, so does a defendant’s political use. After
all, the First Amendment “‘has its fullest and most urgent application’ to speech uttered during a campaign for political office.”153
149

Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1186.
Id. at 1184–86.
151
Id. at 1184–87. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court held that when
a public official brings a defamation lawsuit, the First Amendment protection extended to
political and other noncommercial speech demands that he prove, by clear and convincing
evidence, that the defendant made the false statement at issue with actual malice. 376
U.S. 254, 256–59, 264, 268–70, 279–80 (1964). The Court defined actual malice as
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. Id. at 279–80. Later, the Court
extended the proof of actual malice requirement to public figure plaintiffs who sue for
defamation or intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (intentional infliction of emotional distress); Curtis Publ’g
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring in the result)
(defamation). In addition, the Court has required proof of actual malice in false light
publicity cases. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387–90 (1967). The actual malice
requirement is explored more fully in the Article’s later sections dealing with the
potential usefulness of false light publicity claims to performers in the political use
settings on which this Article focuses. See infra text accompanying notes 358–75. Hoffman
serves as an example of a judicial inclination to require proof of actual malice when a wellknown plaintiff seeks legal relief because of false representations about him—even when
the plaintiff invokes a legal theory other than the ones as to which the Supreme Court has
said the actual malice requirement attaches. See Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1186–87. In
Hoffman, the famous actor’s right of publicity claim was premised on the notion that, in
using the altered photos in the magazine, the defendants created the false impression that
Hoffman had participated voluntarily in a photo shoot for the magazine and the false
impression that the body shown in the altered photo was Hoffman’s actual body. See id. at
1187–88.
152
Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1188.
153
Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989) (quoting
Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)).
150
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Other decisions may be influential in similar ways and may
complicate a celebrity’s attempts to succeed on a right of publicity
claim regarding a use of her identity in a political context. Consider, for instance, Facenda v. NFL Films, Inc.154 In that case, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed a grant of summary
judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the executor of his father’s estate, on a right of publicity claim based on the defendant’s use of
the father’s distinctive voice in a television program about a video
game.155 The court held that even though a television program
normally would be considered noncommercial, the program was
effectively an infomercial-like advertisement for the video game
and thus was sufficiently commercial for purposes of the right of
publicity claim.156 Although Facenda may seem helpful to plaintiffs
in cases in which they complain about uses of their voices (and
hence identities) in political settings, some courts could distinguish
the case from the political use context on the ground that the television program in Facenda functioned as the equivalent of an ad for
a product (a video game), whereas in the political setting, speech is
what is being sold.157
Moreover, even though it ruled in favor of the plaintiff, the Facenda court issued this warning: “Despite our holding, we emphasize that courts must circumscribe the right of publicity so that musicians, actors, and other voice artists do not get a right that extends beyond commercial advertisements to other works of artistic
expression.”158 Political ads and political campaign events presumably are not the same as “works of artistic expression,” but on the
spectrum of possible uses, some courts may see political uses as
closer to artistic expression than to advertisements for products.159
Those that do so may be hesitant to approve of right of publicity
claims against political users.
Finally, a decision dealing with a political advertisement merits
consideration here even though it was not a right of publicity case.
154
155
156
157
158
159

542 F.3d 1007 (3d Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1011–12, 1025–26, 1031–33.
Id. at 1016–18, 1030.
Id.
Id. at 1032.
See supra note 104.
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It nevertheless sheds light on how courts might classify the use at
issue in right of publicity cases dealing with uses of the plaintiff’s
identity in a political context. In MasterCard International, Inc. v.
Nader 2000 Primary Committee, Inc., MasterCard alleged that
Ralph Nader’s presidential campaign committed trademark infringement, trademark dilution, and copyright infringement when
the campaign broadcast a Nader ad that borrowed from MasterCard’s “Priceless” commercials in an effort to express political
views and promote Nader’s candidacy.160 On the trademark dilution claim, a critical issue was whether the Nader ad constituted a
noncommercial use. If the ad was noncommercial, an exemption in
the Federal Trademark Dilution Act would apply and the ad could
not serve as the basis for a valid dilution claim.161
MasterCard argued that the ad should be treated as commercial
because financial contributions to Nader’s campaign supposedly
increased after the ad began running.162 The court, however, declined to give that argument the effect MasterCard desired.163 After
noting that the Nader ad “is not designed to entice consumers to
buy products or services, and does not propose any kind of commercial transaction,” the court stated that “[e]ven assuming the
Nader [a]d caused greater contribution to be made to his political
campaign, this would not be enough to deem [the ad] ‘commercial.’”164 If that supposed fact sufficed to make the ad commercial,
the court continued, “all political campaign speech would also be
‘commercial speech’ since all political candidates collect contributions.”165 The court concluded, therefore, that even though the
Nader campaign used the plaintiff’s trademarks in their ad, the po-

160

No. 00 Civ. 6068 (GBD), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3644, *1–4 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 8,
2004). The court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the trademark
infringement claim because the plaintiff had failed to prove the necessary likelihood of
confusion among consumers. Id. at *5–14. On the copyright infringement claim, the court
granted summary judgment to the defendants after holding that the fair use defense
would protect them against liability. Id. at *31–49.
161
Id. at *22–29; see 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2012).
162
MasterCard, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3644, at *23.
163
Id. at *24.
164
Id. at *23.
165
Id. at *23–24.
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litical nature of the ad made it noncommercial and, therefore, not a
basis for liability on dilution grounds.166
As this Part’s analysis has revealed, the court’s treatment of
the right of publicity claim in Browne v. McCain should be reassuring for celebrities whose voices were used in political contexts
without their consent, but the decision must be viewed with proper
perspective.167 There are various reasons why some courts may be
likely to take a dimmer view of right of publicity claims in such settings.168 Celebrities, accordingly, should not regard the right of
publicity as a consistently attractive theory for protecting their interests when others make political uses of their names, likenesses,
or identities. Another so far unutilized theory is the subject of later
discussion and analysis.169 First, however, the following Part examines the other theory, aside from the right of publicity, that
plaintiffs have employed in cases involving political uses of their
identities: false endorsement under section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act.

166

Id. at *28. In conducting its analysis and issuing its ruling on the commercial-ornoncommercial use issue, the court relied on another federal court’s decision in a similar
case. Id. at *26–28 (citing Am. Family Life Insurance Co. v. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d 682
(N.D. Ohio 2002)). In American Family Life Insurance Co. v. Hagan, the defendant
(Hagan) was a candidate for Governor of Ohio. His campaign ran ads that promoted his
candidacy and criticized his opponent, incumbent Governor Robert Taft. 266 F. Supp. 2d
at 685. The Hagan ads used a “TaftQuack” character that drew upon the plaintiff
insurance company’s trademark, the American Family Life Insurance Company
(“AFLAC”) duck. Id. at 685–86. The Hagan campaign also operated a “taftquack.com”
website that promoted Hagan’s candidacy and sought financial donations. Id. at 686–87.
AFLAC sued on various grounds, including trademark dilution. Id. at 685. As in Nader,
the key issue for purposes of the dilution claim was whether the Hagan ads and website
were noncommercial and hence not subject to liability under the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act. Id. at 695–701. Using reasoning similar to that employed later in Nader, the
Hagan court held that the ads and website constituted political speech and were therefore
noncommercial in nature. Id. at 697–98, 700–01.
167
See supra text accompanying notes 117–20.
168
See supra text accompanying notes 121–66.
169
See infra text accompanying notes 296–431.
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II. PERFORMERS’ FALSE ENDORSEMENT CLAIMS AGAINST
POLITICAL USERS
A. Background on False Endorsement Claims Under Section 43(a)
The federal Lanham Act governs the registration and protection of trademarks.170 Section 43(a) of the statute, however, extends beyond the trademark rights setting and has been interpreted
as sweeping in other claims of an unfair competition nature171 In
the portion relevant here, section 43(a) proscribes the making of
false or misleading representations by a provider of goods or services if those representations create a likelihood of confusion about
whether an affiliation or relationship of sponsorship or endorsement exists between the provider of the goods or services and
another person.172 The section 43(a) violator may face civil liability
to a party harmed by the false or misleading representations.173
Courts interpreting section 43(a) have held that in addition to
covering claims for infringement of unregistered trademarks,174 the
170

See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141 (2012).
Id. § 1125(a); see, e.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S.
23, 28–29 (2003).
172
Section 43(a) reads:
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services,
or any container of goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false
designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false
or misleading representation of fact, which—
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as
to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with
another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or
her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the
nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or
another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities,shall be
liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is
likely to be damaged by such act.
§ 1125(a)(1). Section 1125(a)(1)(A) covers certain claims of unfair competition or unfair
trade practices, if those claims are sufficiently connected to the statute’s text. Dastar, 539
U.S. at 29. Section 1125(a)(1)(B) authorizes false advertising claims by one competitor
against another. Section 43(a)-based false advertising claims are not pertinent to the
issues addressed in this Article and will not be discussed further.
173
§ 1125(a)(1).
174
See, e.g., Dastar, 539 U.S. at 29–30, 31–32 (discussing section 43(a)’s application to
trademark infringement claims, including ones based on unregistered trademarks). The
171
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statute authorizes certain unfair competition claims that are sufficiently false representation-oriented.175 The list includes passing
off, reverse passing off,176 and false endorsement,177 with the latter
being the most relevant section 43(a) claim for purposes of this Article. In recognizing false endorsement as a permissible claim under
section 43(a), courts have concluded that the requisite false representations by providers of goods or services need not be express in
nature. Implied representations suffice for purposes of the statute,
if they convey the untrue message that the plaintiff endorses the
defendant’s goods or services.178 To succeed with the false endorsement claim, the plaintiff must also satisfy the statutory requirement of proving a likelihood of confusion on the part of the
public as to whether such an endorsement relationship exists between the parties.179
The fact patterns underlying false endorsement claims tend to
resemble the fact patterns in right of publicity cases—so much so
that plaintiffs often plead the two theories in the alternative.180 The
required likelihood of confusion element in false endorsement cases, however, distinguishes the two causes of action from each other. Likelihood of confusion is not a required element of a right of
publicity claim, even though a policy concern supporting recognition of the right of publicity is the desire to prevent the public from

“word, name, symbol, or device” and “likely to cause confusion” references in section
43(a) have a trademark infringement ring to them. See § 1125(a)(1)(A); Dastar, 539 U.S.
at 29–30, 31–32.
175
See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 29.
176
Id. at 27–28, 30–31. Passing off “occurs when a producer misrepresents his own
goods or services as someone else’s,” whereas reverse passing off “is the opposite: [t]he
producer represents someone else’s goods or services as his own.” Id. at 27 n.1. In
Dastar, the Court indicated that reverse passing off claims may indeed be brought under
section 43(a), but noted that in the case before it, the plaintiff’s claim was unmeritorious.
See id. at 31–38.
177
See, e.g., Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1106–11 (9th Cir. 1992); White v.
Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399–1401 (9th Cir. 1992); Allen v. Nat’l Video,
Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 625–30 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
178
See, e.g., Waits, 978 F.2d at 1110–11; Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 626–28.
179
See § 1125(a)(1)(A).
180
See, e.g., Waits, 978 F.2d at 1096–98; White, 971 F.2d at 1396; Allen, 610 F. Supp. at
617.
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reaching the erroneous conclusion that the celebrity endorses a
particular product, service, or business.181
Two leading false endorsement decisions furnish useful illustrations. In Allen v. National Video, Inc.,182 a federal district court
granted famous movie director and actor Woody Allen summary
judgment on his false endorsement claim183 against a video rental
company that used a look-alike of him in advertisements.184 After
noting that section 43(a) of the Lanham Act reaches “potential deception which threatens economic interests analogous to those protected by trademark law,”185 the court observed that a celebrity
such as Allen has “a similar commercial investment in the ‘drawing power’ of his or her name and face in endorsing products and in
marketing a career.”186 Accordingly, the court concluded that false
endorsement claims involving the misleading use of a celebrity’s
name or photo could be actionable under the statute.187 Allen’s
claim presented the look-alike wrinkle, but the court did not regard
that fact as calling for an analysis different from the analysis employed in the name or photo cases.188 The key question remained:
“whether defendant’s advertisement creates the likelihood of consumer confusion over whether plaintiff endorsed or was otherwise
involved with [defendant’s] goods and services?”189

181

See supra text accompanying note 36.
610 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
183
Allen also sued on right of publicity grounds, with the key issue being whether the
defendant’s use of an Allen look-alike amounted to the use of the celebrity’s “portrait or
picture,” as required by the applicable New York statute. Id. at 622; see N.Y. CIV. RTS.
LAW §§ 50–51 (McKinney 2016). After lengthy discussion, see Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 620–
25, the court found it unnecessary to decide that issue and unnecessary to rule on the
right of publicity claim, because false endorsement clearly furnished Allen a basis for
winning the case. Id. at 624–25.
184
Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 617–18, 625–32.
185
Id. at 625. The court was thus confirming that section 43(a) extends beyond pure
trademark claims. See id.
186
Id. In addition, the court noted that the celebrity’s drawing power depends upon the
development of public goodwill. Id. at 626. This means that “infringement of the
celebrity’s rights also implicates the public’s interest in being free from deception when it
relies on a public figure’s endorsement in an advertisement.” Id.
187
Id.
188
See id.
189
Id. at 627.
182
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National Video’s advertisement did not expressly say that Allen endorsed the video rental store, but Allen proved the existence
of an implied message of endorsement that stemmed from the degree of similarity between the look-alike’s appearance and Allen’s
appearance and from other aspects of the advertisement’s visual
content.190 The court also reached the “inescapable conclusion”
that the defendants’ use of the look-alike in their advertisement
created the requisite likelihood of confusion regarding endorsement or similar involvement.191 Hence, Allen was entitled to summary judgment and injunctive relief on the false endorsement
claim.192
The reasoning in Allen influenced the Ninth Circuit’s analysis
in Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., the second of the two false endorsement
cases examined here.193 Waits holds special relevance for this Article’s purposes because the case involved the defendant’s use of a
celebrity’s recognizable voice in an advertisement. In a radio commercial for the company’s Salsa Rio Doritos, Frito-Lay included an
advertising jingle sung by a sound-alike of well-known, raspyvoiced singer Tom Waits.194 The evidence in Waits’s lawsuit
against Frito-Lay and its advertising agency revealed that the defendants wanted the vocal impersonator who sang in the commercial to imitate Waits’s voice.195 Waits sued on two alternative
grounds: right of publicity and false endorsement. The Ninth Circuit upheld a jury verdict of more than $2 million in favor of Waits
on his right of publicity claim.196 This Section focuses on the
court’s determination of whether the false endorsement claim furnished Waits an alternative basis for relief.
As a preliminary matter, the court addressed what it regarded
as a question of first impression in the Ninth Circuit: whether false
190

See id. at 617–18, 625–26, 627 n.8. The court observed that “[w]hen a public figure
of Woody Allen’s stature appears in an advertisement, his mere presence is inescapably to
be interpreted as an endorsement.” Id. at 627 n.8.
191
Id. at 628.
192
Id. at 630–32.
193
978 F.2d 1093, 1106, 1110–11 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 625–28).
194
Id. at 1096–98.
195
See id. at 1097–98. The court noted that Waits had long taken a public stance that as
an artist, he would not take part in commercials for products. Id. at 1097.
196
Id. at 1102–06; see also supra note 50.
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endorsement claims may be pursued under section 43(a).197 The
court found it persuasive that in various decisions, including Allen,
other courts had provided a “yes” answer to that question.198
Through its own examination of the statutory language and relevant legislative history, the Ninth Circuit became further convinced that section 43(a) authorizes false endorsement claims, including those based on the invocation of a celebrity’s distinctive
voice.199
The defendants argued that even if some false endorsement
claims are cognizable under section 43(a), Waits lacked standing to
make the claims because he was not the defendants’ competitor.200
In rejecting this argument, the court cited Allen for the propositions that competitor status is not always necessary and that the
plaintiff may invoke section 43(a) if he or she has an economic interest “in controlling the commercial exploitation of his or her
identity.”201 The Ninth Circuit held, therefore, that “a celebrity
whose endorsement of a product is implied through the imitation of
a distinctive attribute of the celebrity’s identity[] has standing to
sue for false endorsement” under section 43(a).202 Because Waits
had the requisite economic interest concerning his identity, he was
entitled to seek relief “for the imitation of his voice on the theory
that its use falsely associated him with Doritos as an endorser.”203
In considering the merits of Waits’s claim, the Ninth Circuit
examined the evidence regarding two interrelated questions: (1)
whether, as the plaintiff alleged, the defendants’ commercial falsely implied a product endorsement; and (2) whether the commercial
created a likelihood of consumer confusion along those lines?204
The jury listened to the defendants’ commercial and to recordings
of Waits’s actual voice.205 In addition, the jury heard evidence indicating that the defendants wanted the vocal impersonator to im197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205

Waits, 978 F.2d 1093, 1106.
Id. at 1106–07.
Id. at 1107.
Id.
Id. at 1110.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1110–11.
Id. at 1111.
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itate Waits, that the commercial was targeted to an audience of the
same age range as many Waits fans, and that numerous consumers
thought Waits actually sang in the commercial.206 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the evidence “was sufficient to support the
jury’s finding that consumers were likely to be misled by the commercial into believing that Waits endorsed [Salsa Rio] Doritos.”207
With its approving nod to section 43(a)-based false endorsement claims stemming from defendants’ uses of celebrities’ distinctive voices, Waits is a significant decision for purposes of the
scenarios addressed in this Article. But Waits involved a use that
was clearly commercial in nature,208 as opposed to a political use
such as a candidate’s campaign ad or a campaign event. Whether
that difference matters—or should matter—for purposes of section
43(a) is a question that merits further examination.209 The following sections begin that process by focusing on the two leading cases
in which performers have attempted to pursue false endorsement
claims against political users.
B. False Endorsement Ruling in Browne: Discussion, Analysis, and
What to Make of It
Earlier, the Article devoted considerable attention to the right
of publicity claim in Browne v. McCain.210 Browne also brought a
section 43(a)-based false endorsement claim against Senator
McCain and the RNC211 over their political ad’s use of portions of
206

Id.
Id. Although the Ninth Circuit ruled that Waits had established everything necessary
regarding his false endorsement claim, it also determined that the damages awarded by
the jury on his false endorsement claim were duplicative of some of the damages awarded
on his right of publicity claim. Id. The court therefore vacated the damages portion of the
judgment on the false endorsement claim, id., while upholding the damages awarded on
the right of publicity claim. Id. at 1103–06.
208
See id. at 1096–98 (discussing the defendants’ product-promoting commercial). The
court’s holdings regarding false endorsement claims also seemed to contemplate productpromotion uses by defendants. See id. at 1108, 1110–11.
209
See supra text accompanying notes 214–57.
210
Browne v. McCain, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1062 (C.D. Cal. 2009); see also supra notes 67–
113 and accompanying text.
211
There were actually two false endorsement claims—one against each of the two
defendants. The court addressed the false endorsement claim against Senator McCain in
one opinion and the false endorsement claim against the RNC in a separate but
substantively identical opinion issued on the same date. See Browne v. McCain, 611 F.
207
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Running on Empty (that featured Browne’s voice).212 The court addressed the false endorsement claim in the context of the defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.213
The defendants’ first argument for dismissal had both statutory
and constitutional features. On the statutory side, they contended
that section 43(a) applies only to commercial speech and that, because their ad was political rather than commercial in nature,
Browne’s false endorsement claim should fail.214 The court rejected that argument and pointed to decisions indicating that section 43(a) applies not only to commercial speech but also to noncommercial speech of a political nature.215 The defendants fared no
better when they invoked the argument’s related constitutional feature by asserting that, given the political subject matter and context
of the speech in which they engaged, permitting Browne’s claim
against them would violate the First Amendment.216 As the court
reminded the defendants, “the mere fact that a defendant is en-

Supp. 2d 1073 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (addressing false endorsement claim against McCain);
Browne v. McCain, 612 F. Supp. 2d 1125 (addressing false endorsement claim against
RNC) (C.D. Cal. 2009). Both of those opinions were separate from the opinion (also
issued on the same date) in which the court dealt with Browne’s right of publicity claim.
See Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1062. The Article’s discussion of the false endorsement
claims against the two defendants lumps the claims together because the court treated
them identically. For convenience purposes, the Article provides citations primarily to
the opinion dealing with the claim against Senator McCain and not to the pages setting
forth identical content in the opinion dealing with the claim against the RNC.
212
The key facts are summarized earlier in the Article. See supra text accompanying
notes 67–77.
213
Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1073; Browne, 612 F. Supp. 2d 1125.
214
Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1078–79.
215
Id. at 1079. For the proposition that section 43(a)’s reach extends beyond
commercial speech to political speech as well, the court cited United We Stand America,
Inc. v. United We Stand, America New York, Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 92–93 (2d Cir. 1997), and
MGM-Pathe Communications Co. v. Pink Panther Patrol, 774 F. Supp. 869, 876 (S.D.N.Y.
1991). See Browne, 611 F. Supp. at 1079. The cited cases indicate that certain aspects of
the defendants’ uses in those cases may partially distinguish them from Browne and the
types of cases being addressed in this Article. See infra text accompanying notes 236–50.
The Browne court’s ruling that section 43(a) can be applied not only to commercial uses
but also to political uses would seem to make the Waits decision relevant, given the focus
in both Waits and Browne on performers’ distinctive voices. For discussion of Waits, see
supra text accompanying notes 193–208. However, the Browne court did not cite Waits.
216
Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1079.
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gaged in political speech, alone, does not bar a plaintiff’s Lanham
Act claim.”217
In their second argument for dismissal, Senator McCain and
the RNC again relied on the First Amendment but added a twist:
This time, instead of arguing that the First Amendment bans any
and all applications of section 43(a) to political speech, they argued
that their ad was not only political, but also effectively an artistic
work.218 The artistic work argument was an attempt to convince
the court to apply a test adopted by other courts in an effort to balance the plaintiff’s economic interests against the defendant’s free
speech interests when the plaintiff seeks to invoke section 43(a) as
to a use that was artistic in nature rather than clearly commercial.219
The test advocated by the Browne defendants originated in Rogers v. Grimaldi,220 a case in which famous dancer and actress Ginger Rogers complained about the defendants’ use of the title Ginger
and Fred for a film.221 Rogers asserted in her section 43(a) claim
that the title would create a likelihood of confusion about whether
she endorsed the film (she did not) and about whether the work
was in part about her (it was not).222 Rather than being about Rogers and her well-known dancing partner Fred Astaire, the movie
presented the story of two fictional dancers called “Ginger” and
“Fred.”223 Attempting to balance the competing interests at stake
in section 43(a) cases regarding titles of artistic works,224 the
217

Id.
Id. at 1080.
219
See id. A brief discussion of those cases follows in the text.
220
875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
221
Id. at 996.
222
Id. at 996–97.
223
Id.
224
The Second Circuit noted that “[m]ovies, plays, books, and songs are all
indisputably works of artistic expression and deserve protection,” but added that “they
are also sold in the commercial marketplace like other more utilitarian products, making
the danger of consumer deception a legitimate concern that warrants some government
regulation.” Id. at 997. The court then added that “[t]itles, like the artistic works they
identify, are a hybrid nature, combining artistic expression and commercial promotion.”
Id. at 998. But, because work titles have a more expressive character than do names of
products, “overextension of Lanham Act restrictions in the area of titles might intrude on
First Amendment values.” Id. Hence, an appropriate way of balancing the competing
interests was in order. See id.
218
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Second Circuit concluded that even if some likelihood of confusion
existed, the First Amendment would furnish a defense against section 43(a) liability if the title was artistically relevant and not explicitly misleading.225 The Rogers court developed this test for section
43(a) cases of the false endorsement variety. The Ninth Circuit later adopted the test in Mattel v. MCA Records, Inc.,226 a section 43(a)
case involving alleged trademark infringement.227
However, after acknowledging Rogers and Mattel, the Browne
court declined to apply what it referred to as those decisions’ artistic relevance test. The court noted that the defendants’ ad had not
been shown to be an artistic work. Moreover, it had not been demonstrated that application of the artistic relevance test to political
speech would be warranted.228 The court observed that under the
limited review conducted at the motion-to-dismiss stage, the court
“would have difficulty applying the artistic relevance test at this
225

Id. at 999–1000. Thus, if the title was not artistically relevant or was explicitly
misleading, there could be liability under section 43(a). See id. Applying the test to the
facts in Rogers, the Second Circuit concluded that the title Ginger and Fred was artistically
relevant to the defendants’ movie because in the movie’s story line, the fictional dancers
were referred to by those names. Id. at 1001. The court also concluded that, though the
title might have suggested to some consumers that Rogers endorsed the movie or that it
was about her, the title was not explicitly misleading. Id. It did not say, for instance, “The
True Life Story of Ginger and Fred” (used by the court as an example of a title that
would have been explicitly misleading). Id. at 1007. The plaintiff’s false endorsement
claim, therefore, failed. Id. at 1001. Rogers also sued on right of publicity grounds but lost
on that claim as well, as the court employed an analysis that seemed to draw, for First
Amendment reasons, upon the artistic relevance aspect of the above-described test for
false endorsement cases. See id. at 1004–05. The court also indicated that because the
movie was an artistic work and was not a disguised advertisement for a product or service,
it was not sufficiently commercial to give rise to right of publicity liability. Id.
Interestingly, considering the subject matter of this Article, Rogers also brought a false
light publicity claim. Id. at 2005. The court rejected that claim in very short order, noting
that the movie was not about Rogers in any way and therefore could not even arguably
have depicted her in a false light. Id. at 1005.
226
296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002).
227
Mattel sued MCA Records and other defendants on various theories, including
trademark infringement, over the use of Mattel’s Barbie trademark in a song that was
titled “Barbie Girl.” Id. at 899. The song contained commentary on the Barbie trademark
and the familiar doll of that name. Id. at 898–99. Adopting and applying the Rogers test,
the Ninth Circuit held that the defendants’ references to Barbie were artistically relevant
and not explicitly misleading. Id. at 902. Therefore, Mattel’s trademark infringement
claim failed. Id.
228
Browne v. McCain, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1080 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
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time.”229 Therefore, the court concluded, the First Amendment
did not require the court to dismiss Browne’s false endorsement
claim.230
Senator McCain and the RNC also sought dismissal of
Browne’s false endorsement claim because their ad clearly identified the RNC as the party responsible for the ad—a fact that they
regarded as depriving Browne of any ability to prove a likelihood of
confusion as to the ad’s source or origin.231 The court observed,
however, that even if the defendants were right and Browne could
not prove likelihood of confusion as to source or origin, the ad’s
identification of the RNC as its source “does not show that a consumer could not possibly be confused as to whether Browne endorsed RNC [or] Senator McCain.”232 Therefore, the court declined to dismiss Browne’s claim on the basis of a supposed inability to establish likelihood of confusion.233
Because the court’s treatment of the false endorsement claim
was clearly favorable to performers, plaintiffs in the types of cases
addressed in this Article would logically seek to rely on Browne if
they brought a lawsuit on false endorsement grounds. But, as noted
in the analysis of Browne’s handling of the plaintiff’s right of publicity claim,234 it is necessary to remember that the court addressed
the false endorsement claim at a preliminary stage rather than issuing a ruling on the merits.235 A full-scale examination of the parties’ respective arguments may or may not have led to an on-themerits ruling in the plaintiff’s favor.
Moreover, if faced with Browne-like facts, other courts might
not take as favorable a view of performers’ false endorsement
claims against political users. In holding that section 43(a) can be
applied to defendants’ political activities, the Browne court relied
on two cases that so indicate.236 Some courts, however, might find
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1081.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 78–84, 117–20.
See Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1078–81.
Id. at 1079–80.
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the political activities in the two cases to be different from those in
Browne. A closer look at the cases reveals why this may be so.
In one of the two cases, United We Stand America, Inc. v. United
We Stand, America New York, Inc., a political organization sued
another political organization for infringement of its federally registered service mark, United We Stand America.237 The plaintiff
used that mark as the organization’s name, and the defendant’s
alleged infringement consisted of using essentially the same
name.238 In its unsuccessful attempt to have a default judgment
against it vacated,239 the defendant argued that because it was engaged in political activities, it was not furnishing “services” for
Lanham Act purposes and therefore should not be held liable for
infringement.240 The court rejected this argument, holding that the
organization’s campaign fundraising efforts and its activities, such
as issuing press releases and preparing campaign literature, were
services typically provided by a political party and affiliated organizations.241 Even though these activities were “not undertaken for
profit, they unquestionably [constituted] a service” for purposes of
the relevant Lanham Act provision.242
However, in explaining its holding, the Second Circuit emphasized what could be seen as a factor distinguishing the case from
Browne. According to the court, the defendant in United We Stand
America was using the plaintiff’s mark “as a source identifier” for
the activities in which the defendant was engaged.243 In other
237

128 F.3d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 1997). The fact that the plaintiff was suing for infringement
of a registered mark meant that the case was brought under 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2012)
(dealing with infringement of registered marks) rather than 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012)
(providing a provision usually referred to as section 43(a) and the one applicable in cases
involving infringement of unregistered marks). See United We Stand Am., Inc., 128 F.3d at
88–89. Both Lanham Act provisions refer, however, to uses by defendants in the context
of goods or services. See §§ 1114, 1125(a).
238
United We Stand Am., Inc., 128 F.3d at 88. Although both organizations were
involved with promoting the presidential candidacy of Ross Perot, the defendant
organization was formed after its leaders had disagreements with the leaders of the
plaintiff organization. Id.
239
Id. at 88–89, 93.
240
Id. at 89; see § 1114.
241
United We Stand Am., Inc., 128 F.3d at 89–90.
242
Id. at 90.
243
Id. at 92.
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words, the defendant was using the plaintiff’s mark in a trademarklike sense. This fact helped to support the court’s conclusion that
the defendant was indeed engaged in services for which there could
be infringement liability.244
The facts in Browne were different. There, the defendants were
not attempting to use Browne’s identity as a source identifier for
themselves; rather, they arguably used Browne’s identity as part of
an expressive political message about the respective presidential
candidates.245 If faced with Browne-like facts, some courts could
regard this difference as calling for a less expansive view of section
43(a) in false endorsement cases than the court approved in
Browne, or as creating a need to ascribe greater weight to the defendants’ First Amendment arguments than the court did in
Browne.246
MGM-Pathe Communications Co. v. Pink Panther Patrol247 was
the other case the Browne court relied on in its conclusion that section 43(a) may reach political activities.248 As in United We Stand
America, the MGM-Pathe court’s ruling that political activities may
furnish the basis for infringement liability came in the factual context of a defendant organization’s source-identifying use of the
plaintiff’s trademark.249 Accordingly, for the same reasons noted
244

Id.
See Browne v. McCain, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1076–77 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
246
See id. at 1078–81. The defendant in United We Stand America unsuccessfully made
this very argument, contending that it was engaged in political expression. United We
Stand Am., 128 F.3d at 93. The court stressed, however, that the defendant was “not
using the phrase ‘United We Stand America’ for an expressive purpose such as
commentary, comedy, parody, news reporting or criticism.” Id. Instead, the defendant
was using the phrase in the trademark-like sense of identifying itself as a source of
services. Id. The court concluded, therefore, that the First Amendment did not protect
the defendant against liability. Id.
247
774 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
248
See Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1079–80.
249
In MGM-Pathe, the owner of a federally registered trademark (The Pink Panther)
alleged that the defendant organization committed trademark infringement in calling itself
the Pink Panther Patrol and outfitting organization members with T-shirts setting forth
the name. MGM-Pathe, 774 F. Supp. at 871. This meant that the relevant Lanham Act
provision was 15 U.S.C. § 1114 rather than the provision commonly known as section
43(a). For discussion of the same issue in United We Stand America, see supra note 246.
The organization provided a street patrol that was designed to protect gays against
physical attacks and educate the public about the problem of violence against gays. MGM245
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earlier regarding United We Stand America, courts faced with deciding a Browne-like case might see a greater need to give credence
to the defendant’s liability-avoidance arguments than the court did
in MGM-Pathe.250
There is another sense in which some courts, if faced with a
case similar to Browne, could take a different First Amendment
tack than the Browne court did. As noted earlier, the court declined
in Browne to apply the artistic relevance test from Rogers
v. Grimaldi,251 because the political ad run by the defendants was
not an artistic work and the defendants had not shown why the
test’s application should be extended to the political expression
context.252 Even if they were inclined to agree that political ads are
not artistic works, it would not be a stretch to think that some
courts would regard a version of the artistic relevance test as appropriate for the Browne-like context. Courts could reason that if
artistic works merit such a First Amendment-based test because of
the substantial First Amendment protection extended to them,253
the same test should also apply to political ads, given the core status of political speech in the First Amendment realm.254
Pathe, 774 F. Supp. at 871. The defendant argued that it was engaged in political speech
and that the First Amendment should protect it against liability because “political
speech . . . is less subject to the trademark laws.” Id. at 877. The court stated, however,
that there was “no legal support for this position” and added that “[t]he seriousness and
virtue of a cause do not confer any right to the use of the trademark of another.” Id.
Although the court did not state specifically that the defendant was using the plaintiff’s
trademark in a source-identifying sense, the case’s factual context clearly so indicates. See
id. at 871. MGM-Pathe and United We Stand America seem cut from the same cloth
analytically—a conclusion reinforced by the fact that Judge Leval authored both opinions.
See United We Stand Am., 128 F.3d at 88 (as a Second Circuit judge); MGM-Pathe, 774 F.
Supp. at 871 (as a district judge).
250
See supra text accompanying notes 237–46.
251
875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989). For discussion of the artistic relevance test articulated
in Rogers, see supra text accompanying notes 220–30.
252
Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1080.
253
See supra text accompanying notes 220–25.
254
See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790–91, 799 (2011); Citizens
United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 329, 339–40 (2010). Moreover, some
courts in the Ninth Circuit might feel more of an obligation to apply the Rogers test than
the Browne court did, because in Mattel v. MCA Records, Inc., the Ninth Circuit adopted
the Rogers test for purposes of a trademark infringement case in which the defendant’s
work was artistic in nature. 296 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002). For discussion of Mattel,
see supra note 227.
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If a court decided to apply the Rogers test in a Browne-like case,
one could see the court—depending upon the facts, of course—
concluding that the use of the plaintiff’s identity was relevant to
the message in the political ad, and that the ad was not explicitly
misleading as long as it stopped short of expressly stating that the
plaintiff endorsed the candidate whom the ad was designed to
promote.255 Such a conclusion would mean that the defendant
would not be held liable. But there would be a counterargument in
a case resembling Browne: Even if the song and recording may have
had some relevance to the campaign ad’s message,256 the performer’s identity—in the form of his distinctive voice—was not relevant.257
The point here is not to make a convincing case either way for
whether the artistic relevance test should be applied (or if so, how
it should be applied) in cases of the sort analyzed in this Article.
Instead, the considerable potential for courts to adopt differing analyses makes false endorsement a less-than-reliable theory for performers to use against users of their identities in political contexts.
The next Section examines another performers’ rights case, in
which that lack of reliability is further underscored.
C. False Endorsement Ruling in Henley: Discussion, Analysis, and
What to Make of It
In Henley v. DeVore,258 the court came to a different conclusion
than in Browne on a famous performer’s false endorsement claim

255

See Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999–1001; see also supra note 225 (discussing the Second
Circuit’s application of the test in Rogers). In Browne, for instance, any misleading
message regarding a supposed endorsement was implied rather than expressly stated. See
Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1076–77, 1081. One would expect the same to be true in almost
all political use cases of the sort addressed in this Article.
256
In Browne, for example, Running on Empty (the song and the recording) may have had
at least tangential relevance to the content of the defendants’ ad, which focused on the
respective candidates’ energy policies. See Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1076–77.
257
For a discussion of distinctive voice issues, see supra text accompanying notes 46–51,
94–96, 121–209.
258
733 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (C.D. Cal. 2010). Both Henley and Browne were decided by the
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, though different judges issued
the decisions. Id. at 1147 (Selna, J.); Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1075 (Klausner, J.).
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against defendants engaged in political activities.259 Don Henley, of
the Eagles and solo career fame, sued Charles DeVore and other
defendants associated with DeVore’s campaign for the Republican
nomination for a U.S. Senate seat from California.260 Henley based
his false endorsement claim on the defendants’ use, in campaign
ads and videos, of altered portions of two hit songs that Henley had
recorded.261 In the ads and videos, the defendants changed the lyrics of the two songs in order to engage in commentary on Democratic political figures and promote DeVore’s candidacy. As a result, the song The Boys of Summer became “The Hope of November” and the song All She Wants to Do Is Dance became “All She
Wants to Do Is Tax.”262
The court considered Henley’s false endorsement claim in the
context of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.263 It began the analysis by noting that, in Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc.,264 the
Ninth Circuit recognized a false endorsement claim under section

259

Compare Henley, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1169 (granting summary judgment in favor of
defendants on plaintiff’s false endorsement claim), with Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1081
(permitting plaintiff’s false endorsement claim to go forward).
260
Henley, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1147.
261
Id. at 1147–49. In the ads and videos, a vocalist sought to “simulate[] [Henley’s]
musical and vocal performances.” Id. at 1168–69.
262
Id. at 1148–49. There were other plaintiffs in the case, but Henley was the only one
who brought a false endorsement claim. Because Henley co-wrote The Boys of Summer
along with Mike Campbell, the two of them co-owned the copyright on the song. Id. at
1147. Accordingly, Henley and Campbell brought a copyright infringement claim against
DeVore and the other defendants. Id. at 1147–49. Henley did not participate in the writing
of “All She Wants to Do Is Dance,” so he had no copyright interest to enforce regarding
it. That song’s writer and copyright owner, Danny Kortchmar, brought a copyright
infringement claim against the defendants. Id. at 1148–49. The court addressed the
copyright infringement claims together. See id. at 1149. Given the defendants’ clear
borrowing from the copyrighted songs, see id. at 1150, the court focused on whether the
defendants were entitled to the protection of the fair use defense. Id. at 1150–66. In a
lengthy analysis, the court concluded that the defendants’ borrowings did not constitute
fair use and that the plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment on their copyright
infringement claims. Id. Because copyright infringement issues are beyond the scope of
this Article, more detailed discussion of the court’s analysis of those claims will not be
included here.
263
Id. at 1149, 1169. Earlier in the proceedings, the court had denied the defendants’
motion to dismiss because, though the court considered it a “close question,” Henley’s
allegations were sufficient to state a claim under section 43(a). Id. at 1167.
264
Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992).
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43(a) “for a vocal imitation of an individual.”265 The court read
Waits as establishing that, in order to win such a case, the plaintiff
must prove a likelihood of confusion “as to whether the individual
actually sang in the advertisement.”266 Although the Ninth Circuit
made such a statement in Waits, it did so in the context of approving a particular jury instruction the district court had given.267 The
context and thrust of the Waits decision, however, suggests that
the court was not ruling out the possibility of false endorsement
liability, even if consumers did not think the defendant actually
sang in the commercial—as long as there was other evidence that
falsely suggested the plaintiff’s endorsement of the defendant’s
product and created a likelihood of confusion in that regard.268 The
Henley court, therefore, may have read Waits more narrowly than it
should have.
Continuing to insist that Henley’s false endorsement claim
could not succeed without proof of a likelihood that consumers
would think Henley actually performed in the ads and videos, the
court observed that given the vocalist’s “less-than-angelic voice in
comparison with Henley’s more soothing vocals,” no reasonable
jury could find a likelihood of confusion.269 Henley submitted evidence potentially suggesting that consumers could reach the erroneous conclusion that he endorsed DeVore or approved the ads
and videos, but the court rejected the evidence as “not . . . probative of whether people would reasonably think that Henley actually
performed the music in the [ads and] videos, which is the relevant
question under Waits.”270 This narrow reading of Waits was a key

265

Henley, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1166; see Waits, 978 F.2d at 1107. For discussion of the
false endorsement claim in Waits, see supra text accompanying notes 193–208. For
discussion of the right of publicity claim in that case, see supra note 50.
266
Henley, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1166.
267
See Waits, 978 F.2d at 1110–11.
268
See id. at 1106–07, 1110–11.
269
Henley, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1168.
270
Id. at 1169 (emphasis added). As the earlier discussion suggests, the question of
likelihood of confusion about whether Henley actually sang was a potentially relevant
consideration, but not the (as in only) relevant question for purposes of possible false
endorsement liability. See supra text accompanying notes 263–68.
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factor in the court’s decision to grant the defendants summary
judgment on Henley’s false endorsement claim.271
Another factor played a key role in the Henley court’s decision
to grant summary judgment to the defendants: reliance on the
Second Circuit decision in Oliveira v. Frito-Lay, Inc.272 In Henley,
the court interpreted Oliveira as establishing that a singer cannot
base a false endorsement claim on a defendant’s advertisement that
used a recording in which the singer’s performance was captured.273 The court conceded in Henley that Oliveira was not a binding precedent because it was a Second Circuit (rather than Ninth
Circuit) decision, but the court found it to be persuasive.274 However, the Henley court’s faulty understanding of Oliveira caused the
court to give Oliveira more sweeping effect than was warranted. A
brief look at Oliveira shows why.
The plaintiff in Oliveira was Astrud Gilberto, the singer on the
1964 hit recording of the song The Girl from Ipanema.275 In an
amended complaint, Gilberto alleged that she had an unregistered
trademark in her performance of the song, as captured in the recording, by virtue of the public’s strong association of the song and
recording with her.276 She further alleged that the defendants infringed this unregistered trademark, and therefore violated section
43(a) of the Lanham Act, by using the 1964 recording in a humor-

271

Henley, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1169. One might think that a court inclined to read Waits
narrowly could easily have found an additional way in which to limit the decision’s effect:
by pointing out that Waits involved a clearly commercial use, whereas Henley involved a
political use. However, the court engaged in no such discussion.
272
251 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2001); see Henley, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1166–69.
273
Henley, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1166–68.
274
Id. at 1168.
275
Oliveira, 251 F.3d at 57–59. The plaintiff’s name was actually Astrud Oliveira, but
she was known professionally as Astrud Gilberto. Id. at 57. The Second Circuit referred to
her by her professional name in the text of its opinion. The same will be done herein.
276
Id. at 59–61. Gilberto did not own the copyright on the song. See id. at 58. Because it
was a 1964 recording, it predated the 1972 enactment that extended copyright protection
to recordings. Id. at 64 n.2. Gilberto, who won a Grammy Award for the performance
captured in the recording, id. at 59, contended that “the song is her signature piece and
the centerpiece of all her concert appearances, that the public associates her performance
of [the song] with her, and that she bills herself as ‘The Girl from Ipanema’ and operates
an instructional website under that name.” Id. at 61.
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ous television commercial for Frito-Lay’s Baked Lays potato
chips.277
An earlier version of Gilberto’s complaint included a false endorsement claim under section 43(a), but that claim was replaced
with the trademark infringement claim in the relevant amended
complaint.278 This change was important to the Second Circuit’s
analysis and to a proper understanding of the decision. The district
court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss Gilberto’s section
43(a) claim because, in the court’s view, no reasonable jury could
find that the defendants’ commercial implied an endorsement by
Gilberto of Frito-Lay’s product.279 However, the Second Circuit
pointed out that, because the plaintiff’s amended complaint had
recast her section 43(a) claim as a trademark infringement claim
rather than an implied endorsement claim, the district court’s reasoning was insufficiently related to the claim that was actually before the court.280 The Second Circuit nevertheless affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s section 43(a) claim, but did
so on another ground. The court observed that, even though a musical work protected by copyright may also serve as a trademark for
an advertiser’s product, service, or business,281 a musical work
cannot serve as a trademark for itself.282 This recognition led the
court to conclude: “For similar reasons . . . that, at least upon the
showing made by Gilberto, the law does not accord her trademark
rights in the recording of her signature performance.”283 Therefore, the Second Circuit dismissed Gilberto’s claim.284

277

Id. at 58–61. In the commercial, the recording of “The Girl from Ipanema” played in
the background as famous models were shown lounging by a swimming pool. As the
camera panned across the group of models, each one looked disappointed to have been
passed an empty bag of Baked Lays. The camera then moved to show the Miss Piggy
character, who was also lounging by the pool and was revealed to be the passer of the
empty bags. Miss Piggy then interrupted with a statement meant to keep the voice-over
announcer from completing a joke about not eating like a pig. Id. at 58.
278
Id. at 59–60.
279
Id. at 60.
280
Id. at 60–61.
281
Id. at 61–62 & n.1.
282
Id. at 62.
283
Id.
284
Id. at 63.
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As noted above, the Henley court treated Oliveira as barring
singers from basing false endorsement claims on defendants’ advertisements that involved the use of recordings in which the singers’ performances were captured.285 But a close reading of Oliveira
reveals that the decision did not prohibit all such false endorsement
claims. The Second Circuit suggested in Oliveira that if it had ruled
on a false endorsement claim rather than the trademark infringement claim, the court might have agreed with the district court
that, on the facts of the case, no reasonable jury could find an implied endorsement.286 This statement—geared toward the case’s
factual context287—stopped short of a flat ban on false endorsement claims when the defendant used a recording that captured the
plaintiff’s performance of a musical work.288 The actual ruling in
Oliveira almost certainly makes such false endorsement claims
challenging to win, but it does not eliminate the prospect that, on
the right set of facts, a performer could prevail.289
Although the Henley court’s too-narrow reading of Waits290 and
too-broad reading of Oliveira291 appear to have been key factors in
285

Henley v. DeVore, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1166–68 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
See Oliveira, 251 F.3d at 60.
287
The factual context included the previously noted humorous content of the ad and
its use of the Miss Piggy character—matters potentially lessening the likelihood that
consumers would think Gilberto was endorsing Baked Lays. See supra note 277.
288
Moreover, the court cited Waits and other cases in which false endorsement claims
succeeded because the plaintiff’s “persona” had been used without his or her consent.
Oliveira, 251 F.3d at 62. Even though the court did not regard the Oliveira facts as
presenting a taking of Gilberto’s persona, the court’s citation of successful false
endorsement cases suggests that such claims can be made out in appropriate factual
contexts. See id.
289
See id. at 62–63. For instance, if the ad in Oliveira had had a less humorous tone and,
besides using the recording of the song, had expressly assigned the name “The Girl from
Ipanema” to an actress who appeared in the ad, an arguably credible false endorsement
claim might have been stated. See Butler v. Target Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1059
(C.D. Cal. 2004) (following Oliveira on arguably similar facts, but suggesting that
potential for successful false endorsement claim could exist in a scenario of sort offered in
this footnote); see also Beastie Boys v. Monster Energy Co., 66 F. Supp. 3d 424, 453–54
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (concluding that Oliveira does not bar a false endorsement claim where
defendant’s advertisement used not only a recording featuring voices of members of
plaintiff musical group, but also various other indicators suggesting endorsement by
members of that group).
290
See supra text accompanying notes 263–70.
291
See supra text accompanying notes 272–89.
286
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the court’s conclusion that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff’s false endorsement claim, it is
possible that the court might have come to the same conclusion
even if it had properly applied those decisions. To win, Henley
would have needed to prove a likelihood of confusion as to whether
he was endorsing DeVore’s candidacy for elective office.292 Doing
so might have been difficult, given the apparently limited imitation
skills of the singer in the ads and videos and the obvious, perhaps
silly seeming, alterations of the lyrics of the relevant songs.293 But it
is also possible that, absent the problematic readings of Waits and
Oliveira, the Henley court might have concluded that there was at
least a jury question on the likelihood of confusion issue.
In the end, Henley offers further evidence that courts have disagreed over the proper handling of false endorsement cases that
focus on uses of performers’ voices and other indicia of their identity.294 Add those disagreements to uncertainty over how to account for First Amendment interests when the uses were political
in nature,295 and the false endorsement theory becomes one that
performers cannot count on as a consistent basis for obtaining legal
relief against political users. There is a need for a different
theory—one that lessens the potential for the disagreements and
uncertainty noted. The Article now turns to such a theory: the
seemingly forgotten tort of false light publicity.
III. FALSE LIGHT PUBLICITY: ORIGINS, ELEMENTS, AND
APPLICATIONS
A. Origins and Development of False Light Publicity as a Tort Theory
In their groundbreaking 1890 article, Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis proposed a theoretical framework for recognizing and
protecting privacy interests under the law.296 Today’s tort claims
for invasion of privacy rest, to a considerable extent, on the founda292
293
294
295
296

See Browne v. McCain, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1080–81 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
See Henley v. DeVore, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1148–49, 1168–69 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
See supra text accompanying notes 263–89.
See supra text accompanying notes 214–57.
Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
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tion laid by Warren and Brandeis.297 After invasion of privacy
claims traveled a not-always-consistent path through the courts
during the ensuing decades,298 William Prosser authored a highly
influential 1960 article in which he built upon the work of Warren
and Brandeis, considered the body of court decisions in invasion of
privacy cases, and classified invasion of privacy claims into particular categories.299 The Prosser catalogue consisted of four types of
invasion of privacy claims: (1) intrusion upon a person’s solitude
or into his private affairs; (2) public disclosure of private facts; (3)
commercial appropriation of name or likeness; (4) and publicity
that places a person in a false light in the eyes of the public (or, as
this variety of claim is usually called, false light publicity).300
Commentators have suggested that, in identifying the first
three types of invasion of privacy claims, Prosser found roots in the
Warren and Brandeis proposal and some of the later emerging cases, but Prosser took more of a leap when he identified the false light
publicity category.301 Regardless of whether Prosser effectively
gave birth to the false light publicity tort,302 or nurtured what was
already there in the law, his article had considerable impact. In relatively short order, courts and legislatures began adopting the fourcategory approach to invasion of privacy claims.303 Prosser’s article
and the developments in courts and legislatures clearly influenced
the invasion of privacy provisions in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts (the “Restatement”).304 In section 652A, the Restatement

297

Richards & Solove, supra note 30, at 1888.
See Richards & Solove, supra note 30, at 1894; Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reunifying
Privacy Law, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 2007, 2008, 2012 (2010).
299
Prosser, supra note 29; see Richards & Solove, supra note 30, at 1888–90;
Strahilevitz, supra note 298, at 2009, 2012.
300
Prosser, supra note 29, at 389.
301
J. Clark Kelso, False Light Privacy: A Requiem, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 783, 783,
788–89 (1992); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, False Light Invasion of Privacy: The Light
that Failed, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 364, 366 (1989); Andrew Osorio, Note, Twilight: The
Fading of False Light Invasion of Privacy, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 173, 183 (2010).
302
See Kelso, supra note 301, at 783, 788–89; Zimmerman, supra note 301, at 366.
303
Kelso, supra note 301, at 783, 787; Richards & Solove, supra note 30, at 1889, 1903–
04; Zimmerman, supra note 301, at 366.
304
Richards & Solove, supra note 30, at 1890; Nat Stern, Creating a New Tort for
Wrongful Misrepresentation of Character, 53 KAN. L. REV. 81, 88 (2004).
298
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lists the four types of invasion of privacy in a manner that largely
tracks the Prosser approach.305
What might be termed as the false light publicity theory’s heyday stemmed from a combination of the Prosser article in 1960,
early judicial and legislative receptivity to Prosser’s four-category
approach, and the Restatement’s treatment of invasion of privacy
in the late 1970s.306 The vast majority of states opted to recognize
the four types of invasion of privacy, including false light publicity,
as potentially viable causes of action.307 In later years, however,
commentators sometimes criticized the false light publicity theory,
with its potential for overlap with defamation among the key reasons for the criticism.308 As the profile of the false light publicity
theory seemingly became less prominent than that of other forms
of invasion of privacy, courts sometimes refused to recognize false
light publicity as a valid claim.309 But those occasions were rare.
Most states still recognize false light publicity as a viable cause of
action, if the necessary elements are proven.310
The false light publicity elements that courts or legislatures
typically require are set forth in section 652E of the Restatement.311
The section reads:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning
another that places the other before the public in a
false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if
(a) the false light in which the other was placed
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person,
and
305

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (AM. LAW INST. 1977); see Prosser, supra
note 29, at 389. Later sections of the Restatement flesh out each of the four types. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B–652E.
306
See Stern, supra note 304, at 88.
307
Richards & Solove, supra note 30, at 1903–04.
308
See Kelso, supra note 301, at 783, 788, 886; Stern, supra note 304, at 89;
Zimmerman, supra note 301, at 369, 451–52.
309
Kelso, supra note 301, at 783; Stern, supra note 304, at 89.
310
Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128, 1134 (7th Cir. 1985).
311
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (AM. LAW INST. 1977); see, e.g., Solano v.
Playgirl, Inc., 292 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 2002); Douglass, 769 F.2d at 1133–38; Roe v.
Amazon.com, 170 F. Supp. 3d 1028, 1034–35 (S.D. Ohio 2016).
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(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless
disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter
and the false light in which the other would be
placed.312
Section 652E’s preliminary language and subsection (a) establish three elements: publicity of a matter about the plaintiff; placement of the plaintiff in a false light; and the highly offensive nature
of the false light, as measured by the reasonable person standard.313
Those elements are referred to in the discussion below as the common law elements. Section 652E(b) adds a further element that must
also be satisfied: a First Amendment-based fault requirement that
the Supreme Court enunciated for false light publicity cases in a
1967 decision.314
B. Common Law Elements of False Light Publicity
The first common law element, publicity of a matter about the
plaintiff, differs from defamation in one important respect but resembles it in other ways. The publicity necessary for a valid false
light publicity claim exists only if the defendant gave widespread
publicity to the matter in question.315 This means communication
to a large audience316—something far greater than what the publication element of a defamation claim requires. In defamation cases,
the publication element is satisfied if the defendant communicated
the statement at issue to at least one person other than the plaintiff.317 However, false light publicity and defamation share the
common-sense requirement that what the defendant communicated must have been about the plaintiff.318

312

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E.
Id.
314
See infra text accompanying notes 367–72.
315
Douglass, 769 F.2d at 1133.
316
Id.
317
ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION § 2.5.1 (3d ed. 2005).
318
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (describing
false light publicity’s corresponding element); SACK, supra note 317, § 2.9 (discussing
defamation’s “of and concerning” requirement); see also Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d
994, 1005 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding plaintiff cannot have been portrayed in false light if
defendant did not portray plaintiff at all).
313
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Section 652E’s requirement of publicity regarding a “matter
concerning” the plaintiff calls for consideration of what constitutes
a publicized “matter.” An express statement, of course, logically
constitutes a “matter”319 in the same sense that defamation cases
usually depend upon an express falsehood.320 Importantly, however, the publicized “matter” for purposes of a false light publicity
claim may be an implication created by the content and context of
what was communicated.321 For instance, there are various false
light publicity cases in which a defendant used photos of a clothed
plaintiff, without the plaintiff’s consent, in or on the cover of a
magazine that features nude pictures or erotic content. In these instances (and similar ones), courts have held that the use of the photos falsely implied that the plaintiff agreed to the use of the photos
and was the sort of person who would voluntarily associate himself
or herself with such a magazine.322
The implied nature of the “matter” publicized regarding the
plaintiff carries over into the element that requires placement of
the plaintiff in a false light.323 Key questions here include whether
there is an implication that the plaintiff took an action she did not
take, holds a belief she does not hold, or has a history or nature she
does not have.324 Consider again the types of cases noted in the
previous paragraph, because they serve as examples not only of implied messages but also of the false light element. For instance, in
Solano v. Playgirl, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that the district court
319

See, e.g., Eastwood v. Nat’l Enquirer, 123 F.3d 1249, 1250 (9th Cir. 1997) (regarding
false statement that had been given in “exclusive” interview); Wood v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc., 736 F.2d 1084, 1089 (5th Cir. 1984) (concerning false statement that
plaintiff had a certain fantasy).
320
SACK, supra note 317, § 2.4.5. However, defamation liability also may extend to what
an express statement falsely implies. Id.
321
See, e.g., Solano v. Playgirl, Inc., 292 F.3d 1078, 1083–84 (9th Cir. 2002).
322
Id.; Braun v. Flynt, 726 F.2d 245, 247–49, 253–54 (5th Cir. 1984); see Douglass v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128, 1135–36 (7th Cir. 1985) (concerning nude photos
that appeared with consent of actress in certain magazine republished without her
consent in magazine that was much more graphic in its typical content); Wood, 736 F.2d
at 1086–87 (regarding private photo of plaintiff sent without her permission to magazine
and published therein); Roe v. Amazon.com, 170 F. Supp. 3d 1028, at 1030, 1034–35
(S.D. Ohio 2016) (involving use of photo on cover of book with erotic content).
323
Of course, the absence of a false light dooms the plaintiff’s claim. See, e.g., Carson v.
Palombo, 18 N.E.3d 1036, 1048–49 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
324
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1977).

2017]

THE FORGOTTEN TORT

485

erroneously granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant,
which published Playgirl magazine.325 The court held that Baywatch
actor Jose Solano, Jr., who was pictured bare-chested, but otherwise clothed, on the cover of a Playgirl issue, had demonstrated the
existence of a jury question as to whether he had been depicted in a
false light.326 The Ninth Circuit agreed with Solano’s argument
that when considered in the context of a magazine whose content
featured nude photos (some of which were graphic in nature), and
whose cover contained suggestive language, the placement of Solano’s photo on the cover could reasonably be seen as conveying the
false impression that he had posed nude for the magazine or had
otherwise willingly associated himself with the magazine.327 The
court went on to note that “a jury reasonably could conclude that
the Playgirl cover conveyed the message that Solano was not the
wholesome person he claimed to be, that he was willing to—or was
‘washed up’ and had to—sell himself naked” to the magazine.328
False light depictions have been recognized in a range of other
settings. For example, in Eastwood v. National Enquirer, Inc., the
Ninth Circuit upheld a jury verdict in favor of famous actor and
movie director Clint Eastwood regarding a National Enquirer issue
that labeled a supposed interview with Eastwood about his private
life as an “exclusive.”329 The defendant contended that it had obtained the text of an interview of Eastwood from a freelance writer,
but Eastwood maintained that no interview had taken place.330 In
the Ninth Circuit’s view, the relevant false light arose from two
foundational matters: the untrue indication that Eastwood had given an interview to the Enquirer (regardless of whether he had or
had not given an interview to someone); and the untrue statement
that the supposed interview was exclusive.331 Given Eastwood’s
usual reputation for taking measures to protect his privacy, his fans

325
326
327
328
329
330
331

292 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1080–84.
Id. at 1082.
Id. at 1084; see similar cases cited supra note 322.
123 F.3d 1249, 1255–57 (9th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 1253–55.
Id. at 1255.
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might have considered him a hypocrite for providing an exclusive
interview about his private life to a “sensationalist tabloid.”332
Two cases decided by the Supreme Court provide additional
examples of depictions that may cast a false light for liability purposes. In Time, Inc. v. Hill, a magazine article characterized a play
as the reenactment of the James Hill family’s experience in being
held hostage by escaped convicts.333 Rather than being a reenactment, however, the play was at most a fictionalized story inspired
by some of the real events.334 The Hill family’s experience was
widely reported shortly after it occurred, but the family had sought
to maintain its privacy during the three years between their experience and the publication of the magazine article about the play.335
Certain events and actions that occurred in the play—such as the
family members fighting back against the captors and being subjected to physical violence inflicted by the captors—did not square
with the actual facts, and thus depicted the family members in a
false light.336
Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co. serves as a similar example.337 In Cantrell, a newspaper ran an article that followed up on a
bridge collapse that occurred several months earlier.338 The article
focused on the aftermath for a family following the death of a father
in the bridge collapse.339 Although the mother was not present
332

Id. at 1250, 1255–56. There was also a “washed-up” concern of the sort present in
Solano. Id. at 1256; see also supra text accompanying notes 325–28. In upholding the
damages awarded by the jury to Eastwood, the Ninth Circuit noted that the jury could
have thought Eastwood’s fans would think he was “essentially washed up as a movie star
if he was courting publicity in a sensationalist tabloid.” Eastwood, 123 F.3d at 1256. Later
in the Article, damages issues in false light publicity cases will be considered briefly. See
infra text accompanying notes 354–57, 420–21.
333
385 U.S. 374, 378 (1967).
334
Id. at 379.
335
Id. at 377–79.
336
Id. at 378–79. The family members won their false light publicity case in the New
York courts. Id. at 379. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded, though not on
the basis of the common law elements of false light publicity. Rather, the Court used the
case to engraft a First Amendment-based fault requirement on the previously existing
elements of false light publicity. See id. at 387–97. For discussion of this aspect of Hill, see
infra text accompanying notes 367–72.
337
419 U.S. 245 (1974).
338
Id. at 246–47.
339
Id.
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when the reporter who wrote the article visited the family’s home,
the article described her as “wear[ing] the same mask of nonexpression she wore at the funeral” and as being too proud to accept offers of help despite the family’s poverty.340 The article also
contained inaccurate details about the family’s poverty and the
supposedly dilapidated condition of the family’s home.341 The requisite false light for liability purposes, therefore, was present.342
With defamation and false light publicity both requiring proof
of a falsehood regarding the plaintiff, the line between the two torts
is not always clear.343 Falsehoods that malign the plaintiff by indicating that he is dishonest, is incompetent in his profession or
business, or has a bad moral character affect the plaintiff’s reputation and represent the type of statement at issue in a defamation
case.344 Some of the express or implied messages in false light cases
tend to be similar in argued or likely effect.345 As a result, it is not
unusual for a plaintiff to plead defamation and false light publicity
as alternative theories.346
However, statements that do not bear upon the plaintiff’s reputation—and therefore do not give rise to a valid defamation
claim—may still be actionable on false light publicity grounds.347
Consider again the facts in the Eastwood, Hill, and Cantrell cases.
In none of those cases would the falsehoods have tended to harm
the plaintiff’s reputation. Nevertheless, the respective plaintiffs
340

Id. at 248.
Id. at 247–48.
342
Id. The family members had been made “the objects of pity and ridicule.” Id. A
federal district court jury returned a verdict in favor of the family, id. at 246–47, but the
Sixth Circuit reversed on First Amendment grounds. Id. at 247. The Supreme Court,
however, reversed and remanded after concluding that the relevant First Amendmentbased false requirement had been established. Id. at 251–54. For discussion of that aspect
of the case, see infra text accompanying notes 383–89.
343
This is among the reasons why some commentators have criticized the false light
publicity theory. See supra text accompanying note 308.
344
See SACK, supra note 317, § 2.4.1.
345
See, e.g., Solano v. Playgirl, Inc., 292 F.3d 1078, 1083–84 (9th Cir. 2002).
346
See, e.g., Braun v. Flynt, 726 F.2d 245, 247 (5th Cir. 1984); Mallory v. S&S
Publishers, 168 F. Supp. 3d 760, 765, 775–76 (E.D. Pa. 2016); Mzamane v. Winfrey, 693
F. Supp. 2d 442, 461, 466, 510–11 (E.D. Pa. 2010).
347
See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 378–79 (1967); Douglass v. Hustler Magazine,
Inc., 769 F.2d 1128, 1134 (7th Cir. 1985); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E
cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
341
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were depicted in a false light.348 As a related matter, defamation
and false light publicity also differ in terms of the harms they are
designed to guard against and the damages that may be awarded.349
The plaintiff who proves that she was depicted in a false light
must also prove that the false light would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person.350 This requirement focuses on whether “the
plaintiff, as a reasonable [person], would be justified in the eyes of
the community in feeling seriously offended and aggrieved by the
publicity.”351 A trivial annoyance will not suffice.352 Whether the
required degree of offensiveness is present is necessarily a factspecific inquiry, but if the required false light depiction is demonstrated, courts seem inclined to conclude that the false light would
be highly offensive.353
The requirement that the necessary false light also must havebeen highly offensive carries over into consideration of the types of
harm contemplated by this basis for legal relief. Whereas defamation law focuses on actual or likely harm to the plaintiff’s reputation for honesty, moral character, and professional competence,354
the plaintiff in a false light publicity case need not prove such reputational harm.355 The relevant harms in false light publicity cases
involve mental suffering, such as embarrassment, humiliation, con348

See supra notes 337–42 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 354–57 and accompanying text.
350
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E.
351
Id. cmt. c; accord Roe v. Amazon.com, 170 F. Supp. 3d 1028, 1035 (S.D. Ohio 2016);
Mallory, 168 F. Supp. 3d at 776.
352
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E cmt. c.
353
See Solano v. Playgirl, Inc., 292 F.3d 1078, 1083–84 (9th Cir. 2002) (depicting
plaintiff as “not the wholesome person he claimed to be”); Eastwood v. Nat’l Enquirer,
Inc., 123 F.3d 1249, 1256 (9th Cir. 1997) (creating impression that plaintiff was a
hypocrite); Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128, 1135 (7th Cir. 1985)
(depicting plaintiff in “degrading” context); Wood v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 736 F.2d
1084, 1089 (5th Cir. 1984) (using plaintiff’s picture in “coarse” publication); Braun v.
Flynt, 726 F.2d 245, 256 (5th Cir. 1984) (causing plaintiff to experience “personal
humiliation, extreme embarrassment, and shock”); Roe, 170 F. Supp. 3d at 1035 (causing
plaintiff to experience “humiliation, embarrassment, and ridicule”); Judge v. Saltz Plastic
Surgery, 330 P.3d 126, 132 (Utah App. 2014) (casting doubt on plaintiff’s
“professionalism and good judgment”).
354
See SACK, supra note 317, § 2.4.1.
355
See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 386 n.9 (1967); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652E cmt. b.
349
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cern about ridicule, and other emotional distress.356 In targeting
these harms, the false light publicity theory recognizes that even if
a plaintiff did not experience reputational harm, she may still experience injury as a result of being characterized or depicted in certain inaccurate ways and should therefore be entitled to pursue an
appropriate award of damages.357
C. First Amendment-Based Element of False Light Publicity
The Restatement’s section on false light publicity calls for the
plaintiff to prove not only the elements discussed above, but also
that the defendant “had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in
which the [plaintiff] would be placed.”358 This First Amendmentbased requirement stems from the 1967 Supreme Court decision in
Time, Inc. v. Hill.359 To understand Hill, it is necessary to backtrack
and consider the Court’s landmark decision in New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan.360
In New York Times, the Court was confronted with the prospect
that the existing strict-liability nature of the common law of defamation could severely chill the exercise of First Amendment rights
to engage in political speech and other expression on public issues.361 The Court concluded, therefore, that a public official who
brings a defamation case must prove the common law elements of
defamation plus a First Amendment-based fault requirement.362
The Court attached the name “actual malice” to this fault re356

See Cantrell v. Forest City Publ’g Co., 419 U.S. 245, 248 (1974); Hill, 385 U.S. at
386 n.9; see also cases cited supra note 353 (illustrating types of harms for which damages
may be awarded in false light publicity cases).
357
See Douglass, 769 F.2d at 1134–35. Discussion of particular dollar amounts of damage
awards is beyond the scope of this Article.
358
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E.
359
385 U.S. 374 (1967).
360
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
361
Id. at 256, 261–64, 267–71. The falsehoods at issue were inaccuracies in statements
ostensibly about a police commissioner by persons who were active in the civil rights
movement. See id. at 256–59. For an extensive discussion and analysis of New York Times
and other Supreme Court decisions dealing with the First Amendment aspects of
defamation, see Arlen W. Langvardt, Media Defendants, Public Concerns, and Public
Plaintiffs: Toward Fashioning Order from Confusion in Defamation Law, 49 U. PITT. L. REV.
91, 95–140 (1987).
362
N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 270–72, 278–80.
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quirement and defined it as necessitating proof that the defendant
made the statement giving rise to the case with knowledge of the
statement’s falsity or with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity.363 A defendant’s mere negligence—in the sense of failing to use
reasonable care in checking out the truth or falsity of the statement—would fall short of actual malice,364 and would therefore be
insufficient to enable the public official plaintiff to prevail in the
defamation case.365 The actual malice requirement, the Court explained in New York Times, would provide the necessary “breathing space” for speakers and writers to engage in expression regarding public officials without risking potentially sweeping liability.366
Three years after New York Times, the Court was faced in Hill
with determining whether the First Amendment should be regarded as placing limits on false light publicity cases.367 The Court
observed that First Amendment interests “are not the [exclusive]
preserve of political expression or comment upon public affairs,
essential as those are to healthy government,” and that “[o]ne
need only pick up any newspaper or magazine to comprehend the
363

Id. at 280. The Court thus gave a special meaning to the term actual malice, defining
it differently from so-called common law malice (which focused on ill will, spite motives,
and intent to harm). See Cantrell v. Forest City Publ’g Co., 419 U.S. 245, 251–52 (1974)
(discussing the difference between actual malice as defined by the Supreme Court and
common law malice). As an additional First Amendment-based safeguard, the Court in
New York Times required that the actual malice element be proven by clear and convincing
evidence, rather than by the mere preponderance of the evidence standard. See N.Y.
Times, 376 U.S. at 285–86.
364
The actual malice requirement contemplates a subjective, fact-specific test. HarteHanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 686, 688 (1989). Did the
defendant actually know that the relevant statement was false or, if there was not such
knowledge, did the defendant nevertheless communicate the statement with reckless
disregard for the truth? If either existed, actual malice was present. See id. In cases
decided after New York Times, the Court sought to clarify the reckless disregard inquiry
by stating that it asks whether the defendant had a “high degree of awareness of . . .
probable falsity,” Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964), or “in fact entertained
serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.” St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727,
731 (1968); see also Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 688. Reckless disregard thus contemplates
something more blameworthy than mere negligence in failing to use reasonable care to
ascertain truth or falsity. See Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 688.
365
N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 287–88.
366
Id. at 269–70, 272, 278–79. In a later case, the Court extended the application of the
actual malice requirement to defamation cases brought by public figure plaintiffs. See infra
text accompanying notes 373–75.
367
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 376–77, 387–91 (1967).
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vast range of published matter which exposes persons to public
view, both private citizens and public officials.”368 With the subject
matter of the magazine article at issue in Hill clearly being a “matter of public interest,”369 the Court reasoned that, as in New York
Times, a method for providing First Amendment-based “breathing
space” was necessary.370 The Hill Court therefore turned to the
method it fashioned in the earlier case and required that plaintiffs
in false light publicity cases prove not only the basic elements of
the claim but also the defendant’s knowledge of falsity or reckless
disregard for the truth.371 As it did in New York Times, the Court
made clear in Hill that proof of mere negligence on the part of the
defendant would not be sufficient to establish liability for false light
publicity.372
During the seven years following Hill’s adoption of the actual
malice requirement for false light publicity cases, the Supreme
Court decided three more defamation cases and another false light
368

Id. at 388.
Id.
370
Id. at 388–90.
371
Id. at 387–88, 390–91. The Court thus adopted the actual malice requirement. See id.
Even though it did not use the actual malice label in Hill, the Court made clear that “the
standard of knowing or reckless falsehood” came from the New York Times decision. Id. at
390. In Hill, the Court did not state whether it was also adopting the New York Times
requirement that actual malice be proven by clear and convincing evidence. See id.; see
also N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 285–86. However, the Court did state in Hill that “the First
Amendment principles pronounced in New York Times guide our conclusion.” Hill, 385
U.S. at 390. This statement suggests a likely intent to adopt the earlier decision’s
requirement of the higher standard of proof for the actual malice element. See id.
372
Hill, 385 U.S. at 389. The Court stressed that “[i]n this context, sanctions against
either innocent or negligent misstatement would present a grave hazard of discouraging
the press from exercising the constitutional guarantees [of freedom of speech and press].”
Id. But “calculated falsehood” of the sort targeted by the New York Times standard
“enjoyed no immunity” against liability in that case and “should enjoy no immunity in
the situation here presented us.” Id. at 389–90. The Court then addressed the facts in
Hill alongside the newly adopted actual malice requirement. See id. For a brief statement
of key facts in the case, see supra text accompanying notes 333–36. The Court concluded
that if a suitable jury instruction had been given, a reasonable jury weighing the evidence
could have found either a merely negligent misstatement by the magazine or a portrayal
that the magazine knew was false or communicated recklessly. Hill, 385 U.S. at 391.
Because the instruction that was given did not prevent the jury from holding the
defendants liable even if the jury did not find knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for
the truth, the Court reversed the lower courts’ judgment in favor of the plaintiff and
remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 394–97.
369
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publicity case. The first of those defamation cases, Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,373 came only a few months after Hill. In Butts, the
Court extended the actual malice requirement to defamation cases
brought by public figures.374 For a majority of the justices, treating
public official plaintiffs and public figure plaintiffs under the same
rule made constitutional sense because both of those types of plaintiffs played key roles in shaping public debate and engaged in activities of widespread public interest. Hence, the First Amendment
interests at stake in defamation cases were the same, regardless of
whether the plaintiff was a government official or a public figure.375
Next came Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., a 1971 decision in
which a plurality of the Court took the position that if the statement giving rise to the defamation case dealt with a matter of public interest or concern, the plaintiff should be expected to prove
actual malice.376 The Rosenbloom approach meant that even a private figure plaintiff (i.e., someone who was neither a public official
nor a public figure) would be expected to prove actual malice if the
public concern factor was present.377 But Rosenbloom was short
lived.
In the 1974 decision Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Court
pulled back from the public concern rationale relied on by the Rosenbloom plurality and held that if the plaintiff in a defamation case
was a private figure, he need not prove actual malice in order to
win the case.378 The Court reasoned in Gertz that even though First
373

388 U.S. 130 (1967).
Id. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring in the result). For an explanation of why Chief
Justice Warren’s concurrence in the result is regarded as setting forth the controlling rule
in Butts, see Langvardt, supra note 361, at 97 n.39.
375
Butts, 388 U.S. at 163–65 (Warren, C.J., concurring in the result). In a later decision,
the Court offered insights on how one acquires public figure status. See infra note 379.
376
403 U.S. 29, 44 (1971). Recall that in Hill, the Court took an arguably similar tack
when it held that plaintiffs in false light publicity cases must prove actual malice. See Hill,
388 U.S. at 387–88, 390–91. In Hill, the Court noted the broad range of matters that are in
the “public view” and observed that the magazine article at issue dealt with a matter of
“public interest.” Id. at 388. The Hill Court did not appear to hinge the applicability of
the actual malice requirement on whether the plaintiff was a public figure. See id. at 387–
88, 390–91.
377
See Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 44.
378
418 U.S. 323, 344–45, 348 (1974). The Court regarded Rosenbloom’s public concern
approach as unworkable and as subject to ad hoc, inconsistent determinations. Id. at 346.
374
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Amendment interests are at stake for defendants in defamation
cases brought by private figure plaintiffs, those interests are less
strong than in public official and public figure cases.379 Hence, requiring private figure plaintiffs to prove actual malice in order to
win their cases would furnish too much protection to defendants
and too little safeguarding of such plaintiffs’ reputational interests.380 The Court therefore held in Gertz that for a private figure
plaintiff to win his case, he must prove a degree of fault specified by
applicable state law, as long as that level of fault amounted to at
least negligence (in the sense of failing to go as far as a reasonable
person would have gone to ascertain truth or falsity).381 Nearly all
states responded to Gertz by choosing negligence as the applicable
level of fault for private figure plaintiffs.382

However, in a later decision, the Court effected a partial resurrection of the public
concern factor. See infra note 381.
379
See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346–50. In determining that the plaintiff in the case before it
was not a public figure and was therefore a private figure, the Gertz Court offered insight
into types of public figures and how one may acquire public figure status. Id. at 332, 351–
52. The Court noted that one becomes a public figure if he has achieved “such pervasive
fame or notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts.” Id.
at 351. One who is not a general-purpose public figure in the sense just noted may be a
limited-purpose public figure if, despite otherwise seeming to be a private figure, he
“voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby
becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues.” Id.
380
Id. at 346–50.
381
Id. at 346–48; see also id. at 353 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Because of its concerns
that defamation’s traditional allowance of presumed damages and the prospect of
punitive damages could operate to chill the exercise of First Amendment rights, the Court
held that if the plaintiff proves only the minimum degree of fault necessary to win the case
(presumably negligence), the plaintiff’s recovery of damages would be limited to actual
damages for proven injury. Id. at 349–50 (majority opinion). To recover presumed and
punitive damages, the plaintiff would need to prove actual malice. Id. Although Gertz
expressed disapproval of the public concern-focused approach in Rosenbloom and opted
instead for a status-of-the-plaintiff approach, id. at 332, 351–52, the Court partially reinvoked the public concern factor in a decision issued eleven years after Gertz. See Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985). In Dun & Bradstreet,
the Court held that at least the Gertz rule dealing with presumed and punitive damages, if
not also the Gertz rule establishing the fault requirement necessary for a private figure to
win the case, applied only if the case dealt with a statement on a matter of public concern.
Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 751, 761, 763. Additional discussion of Gertz, as interpreted
in Dun & Bradstreet, is beyond the scope of this Article. For such discussion, see
Langvardt, supra note 361, at 98–103.
382
See Langvardt, supra note 361, at 98 n.50.
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Gertz’s spurning of the public concern approach and the decision’s adoption of a status-of-the plaintiff framework may suggest
questions about how Hill should be interpreted and applied. Should
Hill’s requirement of proving actual malice continue to be regarded
as applicable to all false light publicity cases, or might the Supreme
Court take a Gertz-like approach regarding false light publicity and
hold that if the plaintiff in such a case were a private figure, only
negligence would need to be proven?383 The Court declined to address such questions in Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., a false
light publicity case decided shortly after Gertz.384 In Cantrell, the
Court ordered the reinstatement of a verdict for the plaintiffs after
concluding that the Sixth Circuit had erred in vacating it.385 The
Court noted that the jury had been instructed on the actual malice
requirement (i.e., on the need to find knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth), that no party to the case had objected
to the instruction, and that the evidence sufficiently supported a
finding of actual malice.386 Therefore, the Court observed: “[T]his
case presents no occasion to consider whether a State may constitutionally apply a more relaxed standard of liability for a publisher
or broadcaster of false statements injurious to a private individual
under a false-light theory . . . or whether the constitutional stan383

The Restatement suggested these questions in a caveat accompanying its false light
publicity section, but did not attempt to take a position. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652E caveat (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
384
Cantrell v. Forest City Publ’g Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974). For discussion of basic facts
in Cantrell, see supra text accompanying notes 337–42.
385
Cantrell, 419 U.S. at 252–54. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs for
compensatory damages after receiving instructions that required them to find actual
malice in order to rule in favor of the plaintiffs. Id. at 249–50. The district judge did not
allow the plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages to go to the jury because he concluded
that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the defendants had acted “maliciously.” Id.
at 251. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit tossed out the jury verdict, reasoning that the district
judge’s ruling on the punitive damages issue meant that there must not have been an
adequate evidentiary basis for the jury to have found actual malice for purposes of
determining liability and an entitlement to compensatory damages. Id. at 247, 251–52.
The Supreme Court, however, concluded that the jury instructions had properly spoken
of actual malice in the sense of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth, and
that in the judge’s ruling disallowing punitive damages, the judge probably was referring
to applicable state law requiring common law malice (i.e., ill will, spite motives, and the
like) as a prerequisite to a punitive damages award. Id. at 252. Hence, the Court
concluded that the verdict in favor of the plaintiffs merited reinstatement. Id. at 252–54.
386
Id. at 249–50, 252–53.
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dard announced in Time, Inc. v. Hill applies to all false-light cases.”387
Since Cantrell, the Court has not taken up the questions that it
expressly left open. Some courts, interpreting Hill in light of Gertz,
have concluded that negligence is the appropriate level of fault in
false light publicity cases brought by private figure plaintiffs.388
Other courts, taking Hill at face value, have concluded that until
the Court says otherwise, actual malice is the applicable fault requirement in a false light publicity case regardless of the status of
the plaintiff.389 For purposes of applying false light publicity principles to the performers’ rights scenarios addressed in this Article,
it probably makes no difference whether Hill should, or should not,
be treated as calling for a fault requirement less severe than actual
malice if the plaintiff is a private figure. The plaintiffs in such scenarios, to which this Article now turns, would invariably seem to be
public figures,390 and are therefore clearly obligated to prove actual
malice regardless of how broadly or narrowly Hill is interpreted.
IV. PERFORMERS VS. POLITICAL USERS: APPLYING FALSE
LIGHT PUBLICITY PRINCIPLES
Neither right of publicity nor false endorsement under section
43(a) of the Lanham Act serves as a reliable legal theory for performers to assert when they seek relief against those who use their
identities for political purposes. Given the lack of agreement
among courts about how far the two theories can go in regulating
noncommercial uses, and about how to account properly for the
387

Id. at 250–51.
See Wood v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 736 F.2d 1084, 1091–92 (5th Cir. 1984);
Dresbach v. Doubleday & Co., 518 F. Supp. 1285, 1288, 1292 (D.D.C. 1981); Fitzgerald v.
Penthouse, Int’l, Ltd., 525 F. Supp. 585, 602–03 (D. Md. 1981) (holding that plaintiff had
to prove actual malice to win false light publicity claim because plaintiff was a public
figure, but strongly suggesting that if plaintiff had been a private figure, only a showing of
negligence would have been necessary), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 691 F.2d 666 (4th Cir.
1982).
389
See, e.g., Solano v. Playgirl, Inc., 292 F.3d 1078, 1084–87 (9th Cir. 2002); Eastwood
v. Nat’l Enquirer, Inc., 123 F.3d 1249, 1252, 1255–56 (9th Cir. 1997); Douglass v. Hustler
Magazine, 769 F.2d 1128, 1139–41 (7th Cir. 1985).
390
They are widely known by large segments of society and, as such, would be public
figures. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974).
388
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First Amendment interests of defendants,391 performers who find
themselves in the scenarios addressed in this Article may want a
different legal theory to invoke. If faced with deciding performer’s
rights cases, courts should also prefer a theory that would eliminate
some of the uncertainties presented by attempts to apply right of
publicity or false endorsement principles. False light publicity can
serve as such a theory, even though it is a forgotten tort in the
sense that its history has not included cases based on musical performers’ disputes with political users. Section IV.A considers the
ways in which false light publicity is a preferable theory for addressing such cases. Section IV.B explores the application of false light
publicity’s elements to performers’ rights complaints against political users and addresses related issues that are likely to arise.
A. Why False Light Publicity Instead?
Two key features of false light publicity eliminate uncertainties
and points of disagreement encountered under the right of publicity and false endorsement under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.
First, unlike the latter two theories, false light publicity does not
present questions about whether the use was sufficiently commercial or about whether the theory can be applied as a basis for relief
against defendants engaged in noncommercial uses.392 It clearly can
be so applied—and has been applied—in that manner. For instance, the Supreme Court’s Hill and Cantrell decisions contemplated false light publicity liability on the part of magazines and
newspapers even though speech in such contexts is normally considered noncommercial for First Amendment purposes.393 Lower
court decisions, including many cited elsewhere in this Article, also
permit false light publicity liability to be imposed on defendants
engaged in noncommercial expression in the context of magazines,
books, and television and radio broadcasts.394

391

See supra text accompanying notes 121–69, 214–57, 265–95.
See supra text accompanying notes 121–69.
393
Cantrell v. Forest City Publ’g Co., 419 U.S. 245, 246 (1974) (newspaper); Time, Inc.
v. Hill, 385 U.S. 376, 377 (1967) (magazine). For discussion of the noncommercial
classification for such uses under the First Amendment, see supra text accompanying
notes 56–64.
394
See, e.g., cases cited supra note 353.
392
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Applying false light publicity principles to the performers’
rights scenarios on which this Article focuses might at first glance
seem different because doing so would reach instances of political
speech on the part of defendants. However, for First Amendment
purposes, political speech and other forms of noncommercial (and
non-political) speech are classified the same way: as triggering socalled full First Amendment protection.395 So it is not a stretch to
say that if false light publicity can be imposed on a magazine engaged in noncommercial speech that happens not to be political in
nature, such liability should be a prospect for those engaged in
noncommercial speech that is political in nature. In terms of the
First Amendment protection to be afforded, there is no difference
between the two.
Of course, the fact that noncommercial speech (whether political or non-political) is such highly valued expression means that the
relevant First Amendment-based test must be passed before false
light publicity liability can be imposed. That legal reality leads to
recognition of the second way in which false light publicity, as applied to the performers’ rights scenarios addressed herein, is not
plagued by the uncertainties and points of disagreement found in
the right of publicity and false endorsement cases. As earlier discussion revealed, courts have sometimes struggled with how to account for First Amendment interests in right of publicity and false
endorsement cases and have not always agreed on the appropriate
tests or modes of analysis in that regard.396 The First Amendment
framework for false light publicity cases, however, is clear. The relevant test in false light publicity cases, of course, is supplied by the
actual malice requirement, which the Supreme Court, borrowing
from a landmark defamation decision, adopted long ago in Hill.397
Though the actual malice requirement necessitates careful analysis,
courts are familiar with the framework by virtue of decades of deci395

See supra note 104.
See supra text accompanying notes 120–69.
397
Hill, 385 U.S. at 387–88, 390–91. If performers seek to employ the false light
publicity theory against political users of their identities and the requirements set forth in
Hill therefore must be met, the setting in which Hill would be considered seems fitting in
an unusual way. One of the attorneys who argued before the Supreme Court—
unsuccessfully, by the way—was someone who made a bigger name for himself in politics
(and in other ways) than in the practice of law: Richard M. Nixon. Id. at 376.
396
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sions—mostly defamation decisions—in which it has been applied.398 Such familiarity is a benefit, as is the lack of need for a
court deciding a performers’ rights case on false light publicity
grounds to expend judicial resources on deciding which First
Amendment test or framework to apply.399
B. Applying the Elements
This Section uses the basic facts of two leading performers’
rights cases as the primary vehicles for illustrating the potential application of false light publicity’s elements to performers’ disputes
with political users. Jackson Browne’s dispute with the McCain
presidential campaign and the RNC provides one of the sets of
facts, and Don Henley’s dispute with a senatorial candidate provides another example. The two cases, of course, were litigated on
grounds other than false light publicity.400 This Section examines
the facts of those cases through a false light publicity lens and employs the elements set forth in Section 652E of the Restatement:


Publicity of a “matter” concerning the
plaintiff;
 Depiction of the plaintiff in a false light that
would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person; and
 Knowledge of, or reckless disregard for, the
falsity of the matter publicized and the false
light in which the plaintiff was placed.401
The false light publicity theory does not always guarantee a win
for the plaintiff, but it at least gives the performer a fair shot at ob-

398

The leading Supreme Court cases in that regard are summarized in Section III.C.
Because the plaintiffs in the cases on which this articles focuses would invariably be
public figures, courts would not need to explore the question expressly left open by the
Supreme Court in Cantrell: whether a lesser degree of fault than actual malice would be
appropriate in a false light publicity case brought by a private-figure plaintiff. See Cantrell
v. Forest City Publ’g Co., 419 U.S. 245, 250–51 (1974).
400
In Browne, the plaintiff sued on right of publicity and false endorsement grounds.
The plaintiff in Henley brought a false endorsement claim. See supra text accompanying
notes 78–82, 261.
401
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
399
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taining relief while affording appropriate protection for the expressive interests of defendants.402
1. Browne as a False Light Publicity Case
Jackson Browne’s complaint against the McCain campaign and
the RNC, as summarized earlier, centered around the use of his
song and recording (Running on Empty) in an ad that promoted the
McCain campaign and criticized the supposed Obama energy policy.403 Instrumental portions of the recording were used, as were
portions featuring Browne’s vocals.404 If the case had been litigated
on false light publicity grounds, the first question under the Restatement would be whether there was publicity of a “matter concerning” Browne.405 The publicity requirement contemplates
widespread communication to the public—something that was
clearly present, given the fact that the ad was televised and related
videos were posted on the Internet.406
Was a “matter” publicized, however, for purposes of the elements set forth in the Restatement? The “matter” need not be an
express statement; it may be something implied by the content and
context.407 There is a strong argument that the defendants’ ad invoked Browne and his identity without expressly referring to
him—in part, because of likely associations in the public mind between the recording and Browne, but, more importantly, because
Browne almost certainly should be seen as possessing a true distinctive voice that extends beyond the particular song used in the
defendants’ ad. With the public likely to identify Browne’s distinctive voice, Browne’s identity was impliedly invoked as part of the
ad.408 That implied message should suffice as a “matter concerning” Browne for purposes of a false light publicity claim.
402

See infra text accompanying notes 420–28.
See supra text accompanying notes 67–68.
404
See supra text accompanying notes 67–77.
405
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E.
406
See supra text accompanying notes 315–16.
407
See supra text accompanying notes 323–28.
408
This analysis borrows from the treatment of distinctive voices under the right of
publicity. See supra text accompanying notes 46–51; supra notes 50, 123. There is no
reason why the two claims have to be completely walled off from each other in terms of
useful insights. Of course, a right of publicity claim such as Browne’s would raise a
403
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Next, it would be necessary to determine whether the publicized matter portrayed Browne in a false light. Did it, for instance,
portray him as holding beliefs he did not hold, or as having taken
actions he did not take? The defendants’ ad did not expressly say
something along the lines of “Jackson Browne supports John
McCain’s candidacy for President” or “Jackson Browne thinks
Barack Obama’s energy policy is the wrong one for America.”
However, the notion of implied messages is again relevant. As earlier discussion revealed, the relevant false light often may come
from what the defendant’s communication implied through its content and context.409 The use of Browne’s distinctive voice and the
serious tone of the express statements in the ad could credibly be
interpreted by reasonable viewers as sending a message that
Browne had lent his support to the McCain campaign or otherwise
agreed with the energy-oriented content of the ad. Such a message,
of course, would have been false.410
The next question is whether the false light would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.411 As suggested in earlier discussion,
courts that conclude a false light was present generally tend to conclude that the offensiveness threshold was also crossed.412 Necessarily, this determination is highly fact-specific. In Browne’s case,
there is no doubt that he found the defendants’ ad, and the messages conveyed about him, to be highly offensive. As a supporter of
McCain’s opponent rather than of McCain, and as a supporter of
question in some courts about whether the use was sufficiently commercial. See supra text
accompanying notes 121–69. False light publicity, however, can be applied as to
noncommercial uses. See supra text accompanying notes 392–95. It is also important to
note that Browne’s true distinctive voice would keep his false light publicity claim from
being subject to preemption because his voice is widely recognizable. Moreover, the false
impression and offensiveness elements of the false light publicity claim would be extra
elements of the sort that stave off preemption. See supra note 128.
409
See supra text accompanying notes 323–28.
410
The false light publicity element applied here may have a bit of a false endorsement
ring to it, but it should not be seen as calling for a full likelihood of confusion analysis of
the sort required in false endorsement cases. See supra text accompanying notes 180–81.
Likelihood of confusion is not an element of a false light publicity claim. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E. Rather, the appropriate approach is to ask
whether the requisite false light portrayal can reasonably be perceived. See, e.g., Solano v.
Playgirl, Inc., 292 F.3d 1078, 1083–84 (9th Cir. 2002).
411
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E.
412
See supra text accompanying notes 350–53.
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other Democratic candidates over the years, he found the defendants’ ad objectionable—far more than a minor annoyance.413 He
could reasonably be expected to have experienced humiliation,
mental distress, and outright anger as a result of being portrayed
publicly in a way that suggested he held beliefs he did not hold. But
would Browne’s subjective experience of being offended square
with the objective test of whether a reasonable person would be seriously offended? An answer in the affirmative seems obvious. Perhaps the best evidence that a reasonable person in his position
would find such a false light highly offensive comes in the form of
the many complaints (referred to at the outset of this Article) by
musicians about political uses of their songs, recordings, and identities.414
To win a false light publicity claim, Browne also would have
needed to prove actual malice on the part of the defendants with
regard to “the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light”
in which he was placed.415 As suggested earlier, the publicized matter would be the defendants’ use of Browne’s distinctive voice (and
hence his identity) in a way that would cause the public to think of
Browne.416 In choosing a well-known song and recording that featured the vocals of a big-name star for use in their ad, the defendants should have known that the big-name star (Browne) would be
identified in the minds of members of the public when they saw and
heard the ad. The necessary knowledge of falsity as to that matter,
therefore, would be present. In addition, Browne would have had
to show that the defendants acted with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard as to the false light in which Browne was portrayed.
This part of the actual malice inquiry is more complicated. It logically begins with consideration of the defendants’ knowledge of
whether Browne was a McCain supporter and agreed with the ad’s
413

See supra text accompany note 76.
See supra text accompanying notes 1–10.
415
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E. Time, Inc. v. Hill imposes this
requirement. See 385 U.S 374, 387–88, 390–91 (1967); see also supra text accompanying
notes 367–72. Because Browne clearly is a public figure, it is unnecessary to consider
whether decisions issued after Hill suggest that a fault requirement less stringent than
actual malice is permissible in a false light publicity case brought by a private figure
plaintiff. See supra text accompanying notes 384–90.
416
See supra text accompanying notes 409–10.
414
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substantive content. It seems likely that the defendants either knew
Browne did not support McCain and disagreed with what the ad
said, or that they had no reason to believe Browne supported
McCain and agreed with the ad’s content. If they had no reason to
believe those things were true, they should be regarded as having a
“high degree of awareness of probable falsity”417—and hence reckless disregard for the truth—as to those matters.
But the necessary actual malice inquiry does not stop with
these questions. Even if the defendants knew that Browne did not
support McCain and did not agree with the ad’s content, actual
malice must also be shown as to whether the ad conveyed a false
image about Browne to the public.418 The correct inquiry regarding
the false light element—whether a false light would be reasonably
perceived by the public—must be remembered here. With that inquiry in mind, it becomes possible to argue credibly that the defendants either (a) knew of the danger that reasonable viewers of the
ad would interpret it as indicating that Browne supported
McCain’s candidacy or otherwise held beliefs he did not hold, or
(b) willfully disregarded the risk that reasonable members of the
public would so interpret the ad. Under this analysis, the element
of actual malice would be satisfied.419
The above application of the elements of a false light publicity
claim indicates that performers who can invoke facts similar to
those in Browne should have valid claims and should be entitled to
appropriate damages for the humiliation, embarrassment, and emotional distress.420 Moreover, a showing that the false light portrayal
led to lost opportunities for the plaintiff might, on the right set of
facts, reflect a significant enough causal connection to justify damages for such harm.421 Whatever the full scope of the damages re417

Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E.
419
In this analysis, which is designed to sketch out how the false light publicity theory
would be applied, no particular attention is being paid to the requirement that actual
malice be demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence rather than a mere
preponderance of the evidence. See supra text accompanying note 371. In an actual case,
of course, the court would have to determine whether the evidence rises to that level.
420
See supra text accompanying notes 354–57.
421
See Solano v. Playgirl, Inc., 292 F.3d 1078, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002); Douglass v. Hustler
Magazine, 769 F.2d 1128, 1143–44 (7th Cir. 1985).
418
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coverable by the successful plaintiff, the application of the false
light publicity theory to scenarios such as that in Browne has a notable virtue: preventing performers from being forced to participate
in the communication of messages with which they disagree. In addition, proper application of the theory can curtail the ability of defendants to reap political benefits from the non-political acts of
others.422
2. Henley as a False Light Publicity Case
Not all disputes between performers and political users will
have Browne-like facts. As this analysis reveals, the less Browne-like
the facts are, the less likely it is that the plaintiff can succeed on
false light publicity grounds. The Henley facts are instructive in
that regard. Recall that, in Henley, the ex-Eagles ringleader and solo
star lost his Lanham Act section 43(a)-based false endorsement
claim against a senatorial candidate’s campaign.423 In ads, the campaign used portions of two songs that had become hit records for
Henley, but did not use the recordings themselves.424 The campaign altered the lyrics of the songs in an effort to express criticism
of the candidate’s political opponents. Some attempts at humor
appeared to be present in the altered lyrics.425 Although the vocalist
in the ads sought to imitate the sound of Henley’s voice, he evidently did not pull off a very good impersonation.426
If Henley had sued on false light publicity grounds, his prospects of success would not have been as strong as Browne’s would
have been if Browne had sued on that basis. Henley would have had
no difficulty in meeting the publicity requirement, thanks to the
widespread communication of the ads about which he complained.
From there, however, Henley’s chances of success would have begun to dwindle.
It is less clear than under the Browne facts that a “matter concerning” the plaintiff was publicized by virtue of the ads, given
that only songs arguably associated with Henley, rather than his hit
422
423
424
425
426

See S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 541 (1987).
See supra text accompanying notes 263–85.
See supra text accompanying notes 261.
See supra text accompanying note 262.
See supra text accompanying notes 258–61, 269.
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recordings of those songs, were used. The recordings likely would
have triggered stronger associations with Henley in the public’s
mind than the mere use of the songs did. Moreover, though Henley
may have a distinctive voice that is identifiable without regard to
any particular song,427 the argument that his distinctive voice was
used in the ads is weaker than in Browne’s case. Henley’s actual
voice was not used (because the recordings were not used), and the
vocal impersonator who sang in the ads may not have been good
enough to invoke Henley in the public’s mind. Thus, Henley
might, at best, have squeaked by on the “matter concerning” element of a false light publicity claim.
Henley’s prospects would have dimmed further on the question of whether the ads portrayed him in a false light. To the extent
that they appeared to be sophomoric attempts at humor, the altered song lyrics would seem to lessen the likelihood that the public
would interpret the ads as suggesting that Henley supported the
DeVore candidacy for the Senate or agreed with the DeVore campaign’s criticisms of political opponents. And if viewers of the ads
thought of Henley, but perceived a bit of poking fun at him through
the altered lyrics, the public would be even less likely to think that
Henley shared the political views expressed in the ads. Thus, the
false light element probably would not be satisfied. Had a false light
been present, Henley no doubt would have found it highly offensive, but the offense taken by Henley to the ads would not be actionable absent the necessary false light.
Even if the necessary false light were present in the facts, Henley likely would have difficulty satisfying the actual malice element.
The defendants evidently knew that Henley did not support the
DeVore candidacy and probably did not agree with the content of
the DeVore ads.428 But, as noted in the discussion of the facts in
Browne, the actual malice requirement also applies to the questions
of whether a falsity regarding Henley’s beliefs or actions was communicated to the public and whether the public would reasonably

427

See supra notes 50, 123.
They claimed, after all, that they were trying to engage in parody of Henley in
addition to expressing their political messages. See Henley v. DeVore, 733 F. Supp. 2d
1144, 1156–57 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
428
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perceive that false portrayal.429 On those questions, proof of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth probably would be
lacking. The DeVore campaign could argue—probably credibly—
that given the humorous tone of the ads and the extensive liberties
taken with the lyrics of the songs used, they did not know of any
meaningful risk that the public would draw incorrect conclusions
about Henley’s beliefs or actions.
3. Final Thoughts Regarding Performers’ False Light
Publicity Claims
If other performers, unhappy with political uses of their identities, choose to bring false light publicity cases, a few concluding
thoughts and suggestions are in order. First, as indicated earlier,
and demonstrated in the two previous sections, such a claim would
have a much better chance of success if the facts resembled those
in Browne than if they resembled those in Henley. Second, did the
use of the performer’s identity occur in a campaign ad (or an ad
sponsored by an organization that supports the candidate), or did
the use occur at a campaign event? If it was the former, the chances
of the public obtaining an incorrect impression regarding the performer’s beliefs or actions would seem greater than if it was the
latter. Use of a recording at a campaign event, such as to provide
entrance music as the candidate goes on stage, may simply cause
the public to think that the campaign likes the music for whatever
reason, not that the performer who sang on the recording supports
the candidate or agrees with her positions. (The performer, of
course, may be equally unhappy whether the use was in an ad or at
an event, but the public’s perception may not be the same in the
two instances.)
Third, the calculus set forth above may change if the use of the
performer’s identity becomes an ongoing occurrence, such as
where a candidate adopts a particular recorded song as a campaign
symbol and the song is played repeatedly at campaign events. The
ongoing, repeated nature of the use may falsely suggest to the public that the performer identifies with the candidate and has given
the campaign the go-ahead to invoke the performer’s identity.
429

See supra text accompanying note 418.
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Fourth, the content and tone of the defendant’s use may carry
great weight in the analysis. If an ad has a serious tone that appears
to connect the use of the performer’s identity to the political messages expressly set forth in the ad, creation of a false light portrayal
of the performer may be likely. On the other hand, a humorous
tone for the political messages contained in the ad may make it
harder for a court to find a false light portrayal—particularly if
some of the humor is directed at the performer and not just at a political opponent. Finally, a seemingly incidental use of a performer’s identity in an ad—such as using recorded music briefly as
background music without any substantive tie to the messages in
the ad—may induce anger from performers, but is probably not
enough to support a valid false light publicity claim.
CONCLUSION
Every election season reveals uses of songs and recordings by
the campaigns of candidates for public office or by groups that support the candidates. Frequently, then, well-known performers who
have recorded those songs complain about the uses of the songs
and recordings (and of their recognizable voices). Performers who
seek legal relief against those responsible for the political uses may
find, however, that they “can’t always get what [they] want”430 if
they bring a right of publicity claim or a claim for false endorsement
under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Judicial concerns about the
proper reach and application of those theories and uncertainties
about how to account for First Amendment interests make the
right of publicity and false endorsement less-than-reliable theories
for performers to invoke against political users.
The forgotten tort of false light publicity is a better theory for
use in this setting. It is well-established that this theory may be employed in regard to defendants’ noncommercial speech. Moreover,
the First Amendment aspects of false light publicity have been articulated by the Supreme Court. If performers try the false light publicity theory in the political-use settings on which this Article fo430

THE ROLLING STONES, You Can’t Always Get What You Want, LET IT BLEED (Decca
Records 1969). With apologies to Mick Jagger, Keith Richards, and the Rolling Stones.
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cuses “they just might find [they] get what [they] need.”431 Some
performers’ claims should make the grade under false light publicity principles; others will not. In the process, however, courts faced
with deciding such false light publicity cases will also find that they
“get what [they] need”: a theory that sets the governing rules
clearly enough and avoids the uncertainties presented by the theories performers have employed thus far against political users.432

431
432

Id. (with further apologies).
Id.

